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Although the Eighth Amendment guarantees proportionality in noncapital
criminal sentencing, federal and state courts have struggled when deciding
individual cases, and the Supreme Court has failed to articulate legal rules
that could promote the development of a coherent jurisprudence. Working
within the governing law and building on the work already done by
scholars who have focused on this problem, I propose three principles:
transparency, limited deference, and a 'felt sense of justice," that could
guide the process of proportionality review and contribute to defining a
retributivist touchstone for proportionality judgments. Focusing on the
required threshold inquiry, I also outline an analytical framework for
examining offense gravity and sentence severity, and determining gross
disproportionality. My proposal identifies four analytical factors for
assessing offense gravity: harm, culpability, violence, and magnitude; and
two for evaluating sentence severity: the offender's "real sentence, " and
likely age and life opportunities upon release from prison.
INTRODUCTION
Intuitively, the idea of proportionality between crime and punishment
seems simple. There ought to be some sensible relationship between the
wrong committed and the sentence imposed. The difficulty, though, lies in
making normative judgments about what makes sense in this context. For
example, in 2003, the Supreme Court concluded that a fifty-year sentence
for stealing nine videotapes worth approximately $150 made sufficient
sense to deny federal habeas relief.' The bedrock requirement is the Eighth
t Associate Professor of Law, CUNY School of Law. J.D., 1991, New York University
School of Law; B.A., 1986, Brown University. I thank Michelle Anderson, Sameer Ashar,
Rebecca Bratspies, Sue Bryant, Julie Goldscheid, Natalie Gomez-Velez, Jeff Kirchmeier, Ray
Lohier, Andrea McArdle, Ruth Ann Robson, and Steve Zeidman for engaging with me on this
project. I am also grateful for the research grant I received from the Professional Staff
Congress--City University of New York, and to Cynthia Conti-Cook, Andrea Ibrahim, Bahar
Mirhosseini, and Amy Roehl for their research assistance.
1. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 66 (2003).
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Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment,2 but the
contours of this requirement remain unclear. Building on strands of
Supreme Court precedent and the work already published in law review
literature on this topic, I propose three principles: transparency, limited
deference, and a "felt sense of justice,"3 that could contribute to the
development of a more coherent jurisprudence of proportionality. I also
outline an analytical framework for implementing these principles that is
consistent with governing law.
In a series of six decisions over the last twenty-five years,4 the Court has
developed a three-part test and five principles for proportionality analysis in
noncapital criminal cases. Despite their numerosity, these parts and
principles do not provide practical guidance or a coherent theoretical
framework for analyzing proportionality challenges. The problem lies both
with application of the first part of the test, and interpretation of the
principles. The Court has not expressly articulated the relationship between
the three-part test and the five principles, but presumably the principles
inform application of the test. The Court established its three-part test in
Solem v. Helm.'
2. The Eighth Amendment provides in its entirety that: "Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII.
3. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 288 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (coining phrase
to express reliance on a retributivist nexus between crime and punishment).
4. The standard line of cases is as follows: Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 66, 77 (affirming, on
habeas review, two consecutive sentences of twenty-five years to life for stealing approximately
$150 of videotapes, where defendant had three prior felony convictions); Ewing v. California,
538 U.S. 11, 18, 30-31 (2003) (affirming sentence of twenty-five years to life for stealing
approximately $1,200 of golf clubs, where defendant had four prior felony convictions);
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961, 994 (1991) (affirming sentence of life without parole
for first offense of possessing 672 grams of cocaine); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 281-84
(1983) (reversing sentence of life without parole for uttering a no account check for $100, where
defendant had six prior felony convictions); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 370-72 (1982) (per
curiam) (affirming two consecutive sentences of twenty years for possession with intent to
distribute and distribution of nine ounces of marijuana); Rummel, 445 U.S. at 265-66 (affirming
life with parole sentence for felony theft of $120.75 by false pretenses where defendant had two
prior convictions).
Early commentators recognized Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 356-58 (1910)
(reversing sentence of fifteen years hard labor and civil disabilities for falsifying a public
document), and O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 337-40 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting)
(dissenting from denial of certiorari in challenge to sentence of fifty-four years for unauthorized
sale of liquor), as relevant precedent in these cases. See, e.g., Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REv. 839, 842-43
(1969); Herbert L. Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1071, 1074
n.12, 1075 (1964).
5. 463 U.S. at 291-92.
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The first part of the test consists of a threshold that typically bars
application of the second and third parts.6 The threshold requires a
comparison of offense gravity and sentence severity, and a determination of
whether this comparison reveals "gross disproportionality."7 The second
and third parts call for an intrajurisdictional review of sentences received
within the state for more and less serious crimes, and an interjurisdictional
review of sentences received in other states for the same crime.8 If the
threshold is not met, then proportionality analysis ends. Only if the
threshold is met do courts apply parts two and three.
Despite the determinative effect of the first part of the Solem test in the
vast majority of cases, the Supreme Court has not established a process for
making this threshold judgment, nor any substantive guideposts. Instead,
shifting pluralities of the Court have posited five general principles for
addressing proportionality challenges in noncapital cases.9 These principles
are: use of objective factors, legislative primacy, penological pluralism,
federalism, and gross disproportionality. ° At first blush, each principle
seems reasonable if not incontrovertible. When interpreted in a blunt rather
than nuanced fashion, however, the result is to substitute conclusory
reiterations of these principles for rigorous analysis of individual cases.
An exhortation to rely on objective factors in assessing proportionality
makes sense. The alternative is often characterized as subjective,
standardless decisionmaking based on the predilections and politics of
individual judges. Yet there is no process or convention for interpreting
objectivity or applying the Solem test in light of an objectivity principle. To
the contrary, although the second and third parts of the test could anchor
proportionality assessments in fact-based determinations regarding local
6. In Harmelin v. Michigan, a plurality of the Court modified the three-part test
articulated in Solem v. Helm. The Solem Court did not privilege any one part over the other two,
and applied all three parts to the facts under consideration. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-300.
Without fanfare, Harmelin recast the first part of the Solem test as a threshold that required an
inference of gross disproportionality to warrant continued proportionality analysis via
application of parts two and three. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1004-05 (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment); see also infra note 54 and accompanying text. In Ewing
v. California, a plurality of the Court and the dissenters adopted the Solem test with the
Harmelin threshold gloss. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 30-31, 42. Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Kennedy joined Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Ewing, and Justices O'Connor
and Souter joined Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion in Harmelin. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 14;
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 959. I will refer to the Solem test, and to the first, second, and third Solem
factors as shorthand for current governing law.
7. Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-91.
8. Id. at 291-92.
9. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 23 (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 997-1001 (culling some
common principles that give content to the uses and limits of proportionality review)).
10. Id.
40:0527]
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and national sentencing practices, they often are not employed. The first
part, which is arguably the least objective, rarely permits intra- and
interjurisdictional review. Rigorous application of the first Solem factor
requires assessments of offense gravity and sentence severity, and then an
overarching judgment regarding gross disproportionality. Courts face these
tasks with little concrete guidance, and the temptation simply to conclude
there is no gross disproportionality is strong.
Similarly, the principle of legislative primacy has been too easily
interpreted as absolute deference to legislatively imposed sentencing
protocols. This results in an abdication of judicial responsibility to review
noncapital criminal sentences and uphold Eighth Amendment
proportionality standards. Penological pluralism also devolves into a
judicial hands-off policy since virtually any sentence can be supported
under one of the traditional justifications for punishment-namely,
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. Broadly
interpreted, federalism conflicts with the third Solem factor,
interjurisdictional review. Although the development of standards for
comparing sentences across states is possible,11 invocations of federalism
have substituted for engagement in this analysis. The principle of gross
disproportionality is the standard for the first Solem factor and broadly
governs the enterprise of analyzing proportionality in noncapital criminal
sentencing.
The Supreme Court has been fractiously divided in its approach to
Eighth Amendment proportionality in noncapital sentencing. 2 Scholars who
have focused on this topic, as opposed to proportionality in capital
punishment or punitive damage awards, have criticized the absence of a
workable theoretical framework for assessing proportionality and proposed
a variety of potential solutions.13 While many of these critiques ring true,
the Solem test and five principles will likely govern proportionality analysis
11. For example, an examination of the range and density of sentences imposed for a
given crime could give rise to a theory of outlier sentences. See Pamela S. Karlan, "Pricking the
Lines": The Due Process Clause, Punitive Damages and Criminal Punishment, 88 MINN. L.
REv. 880, 896-97 (2004) (discussing possible use of outlier concept). Outlier sentences
imposed in one or a small minority of states, that would be considered grossly disproportionate
in every other state, could be held unconstitutional under the third Solem factor. See id. Another
possibility is to adapt the Supreme Court's multiplier approach to proportionality in punitive
damages cases to criminal sentencing and particularly recidivist sentencing. See State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (suggesting that a 9:1 ratio for
assessing proportionality between punitive and compensatory damages is almost always the
maximum).
12. See infra Part I.
13. See infra Part 11.
530 [Ariz. St. L.J.
RESUSCITATING PROPORTIONALITY
in the foreseeable future. In the spirit of working to bridge the gap between
the legal academy and the legal profession, 14 I theorize within three of the
Court's five principles and then outline a process for applying the first
Solem factor that is consistent with my interpretation of objective factors,
legislative primacy, and penological pluralism.'
5
Building on themes revealed by Supreme Court precedent as well as the
work of other commentators, I explain how the concepts of transparency,
limited deference, and a felt sense of justice would operate within the
Court's principles. Transparency would promote reliance on objective
factors by creating a clearer framework for conducting proportionality
analysis and an expectation of engagement. Transparency requires courts to
articulate the objective factors employed in making the threshold gross
disproportionality determination. 6 It would create a duty to explain how
explicit offense gravity and sentence severity considerations apply to
individual cases. Over time, the accrual of fact-based proportionality
judgments in individual cases would lead to the development of
proportionality rules. These decisions would create a database of experience
that courts and commentators could interpret and use to rationalize
proportionality judgments.
Limited deference would invigorate judicial review of legislative
sentencing schemes and expose overreliance on the principle of legislative
primacy as a substitute for judicial review. Legislatures obviously have the
institutional competence to promulgate general rules in pursuit of policy
goals. Limited deference does not usurp this authority. Instead, it moderates
the judicial impulse to shy away from evaluating offense gravity and
sentence severity in specific cases. A strong understanding of the judiciary's
legitimate role in assessing proportionality in individual cases would
counteract the near total deference courts often give to legislatures in
noncapital criminal sentencing. Limited deference is the flip side of an
assumption of responsibility to conduct meaningful proportionality analysis.
It requires making substantive judgments about whether specific sentences
for specific offenses give rise to an inference of gross disproportionality. If
a sentencing challenge passes the threshold test, then intra- and
14. See generally Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education
and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REv. 34 (1992).
15. I have focused on application of the first Solem factor and therefore do not directly
address the federalism principle which is most closely related to the third Solem factor. I discuss
the gross disproportionality principle, which is explicitly embedded in the first Solem factor, in
the context of objective factors and legislative primacy.
16. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000 (1991) (asserting that objective factors
should inform proportionality review "'to the maximum possible extent"' (quoting Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1980))).
40:0527]
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interjurisdictional review would further inform an analysis of Eighth
Amendment proportionality.
Within the context of penological pluralism, a felt sense of justice could
guide the emergence of a retributivist touchstone within the Eighth
Amendment. There is a well-recognized divide in justifications for
punishment between retributivism on the one hand, and utilitarian theories
of deterrence and incapacitation on the other.' 7 While some have attempted
to construct proportionality guidelines under the umbrella of
utilitarianism, 8 I am persuaded that proportionality between offense and
sentence "is inherently a concept tied to the penological goal of
retribution."' 9 A felt sense of justice could balance the legislature's
prerogative to establish criminal sentencing policy with a judicially-
enforced retributivist limitation.2" Regardless of how well a particular
sentence may deter crime or incapacitate criminals, sentences that bear no
retributivist resemblance to the offenses they purport to punish violate
Eighth Amendment proportionality.
My proposed process for applying the first part of the Solem test
incorporates four analytical factors for offense gravity and two for sentence
severity. The offense factors call for evaluating gravity along four axes:
harm, culpability, violence, and magnitude. The sentence factors require
consideration of severity based on the actual sentence likely to be served
rather than the imposed sentence, and on the offender's age and life
opportunities at the time of his or her likely release.2' These factors are
embedded within the first Solem factor and create a structure for making
fact-based judgments regarding offense gravity and sentence severity.
17. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 13-23 (3d ed. 2001).
Rehabilitation has lost currency as a practicable theory of punishment, particularly in relation to
proportionality. See id. at 52. Expressive theories of punishment, or denunciation, are viewed in
part as a hybrid of utilitarian and retributivist thinking. See id. at 18-19; cf. Michael Vitiello,
California's Three Strikes and We're Out: Was Judicial Activism California's Best Hope?, 37
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1025, 1066-71 (2004) (describing shift in California Supreme Court
jurisprudence from rehabilitation to incapacitation and deterrence).
18. See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the
Eighth Amendment: "Proportionality" Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 594-96
(2005).
19. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Harmelin, 501
U.S. at 989 ("[I]t becomes difficult even to speak intelligently of 'proportionality,' once
deterrence and rehabilitation are given significant weight.").
20. Cf Steven Grossman, Proportionality in Non-Capital Sentencing: The Supreme
Court's Tortured Approach to Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 84 KY. L.J. 107, 168-70 (1996)
(proposing limiting retributivism); Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive
Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 704-08 (2005) (proposing retributivism as a side constraint).
21. The offender's age at the time of the offense would not affect sentence severity,
although it could be relevant to a culpability assessment. See infra Parts III.D. 1.b, 1II.D.2.
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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Transparency would demand that courts apply these offense and
sentence factors and create a written record of their analytical processes.
Limited deference and a felt sense of justice would impact the threshold
assessment regarding gross disproportionality. Courts could not simply rely
on legislative primacy and penological pluralism to justify a conclusion that
the threshold has not been met. Instead, these principles would encourage
them to adjudicate proportionality in individual cases, and give them a
theoretical touchstone, retributivism, to guide determinations of gross
disproportionality. The threshold test factors would establish a well-defined
structure for assessing offense gravity and sentence severity, and contribute
to the development of normative standards and predictability.
In Section I, I reinterpret Rummel v. Estelle and its progeny through the
prism of the Supreme Court's five principles. The standard line of six cases
spans close to twenty-five years, and each decision contains contradictory
elements and reasoning that appears to be based more on shifting alliances
and membership on the Court than principled analysis. Apart from
communicating sub rosa that Eighth Amendment proportionality in
noncapital cases is so weakened as to be virtually meaningless, the Supreme
Court has failed to build a stable methodology for addressing
proportionality challenges. In Section II, I survey the law review literature
on proportionality in noncapital criminal sentencing, highlighting aspects
that could contribute to more rational and meaningful review. My proposal
is situated in the space between this work and the day-to-day work of the
courts. In Section III, I propose a theoretical framework for making
threshold proportionality judgments, interpreting three of the Court's
principles in connection with transparency, limited deference, and a felt
sense of justice. I then identify specific factors for courts to apply when
making threshold proportionality decisions. In Section IV, I foreshadow
how the use of my offense gravity and sentence severity factors could lead
to the development of proportionality rules.
I. GOVERNING LAW AND SEEDS OF CHANGE
A review of Supreme Court precedent illustrates the problems embedded
in its five principles and the Solem test. The cases also contain markers that
can lead towards a more productive approach to proportionality in
noncapital criminal sentencing. The Court was badly split in the standard
line of six cases with three 5-4 decisions, two plurality opinions, and one
40:0527]
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per curiam opinion.22 Parsing these cases demonstrates how invocations of
the four principles of legislative primacy, penological pluralism, federalism,
and gross disproportionality have substituted for real proportionality
analysis. The potential for the fifth principle, reliance on objective factors,
to promote the development of a rational, predictable methodology for
proportionality analysis has not been realized, particularly with application
of the first Solem factor.
The story of these six cases is one of jockeying Justices, topsy-turvy
results, and sui generis reasoning. Presented with strong evidence of
disproportionality in Rummel v. Estelle,2 3 Justice Rehnquist, writing for a
five-member majority, characterized proportionality judgments as
inherently subjective and thus more appropriately the subject of legislative
rather than judicial decisionmaking. The dissent, authored by Justice
Powell, foreshadowed the Solem test and championed the ability and
institutional competence of courts to make objective proportionality
judgments anchored by a felt sense of justice.24
In Rummel, the Court affirmed a mandatory life sentence under Texas's
recidivist statute following William James Rummel's three property-related
felony convictions over ten years, totaling less than $230 in monetary loss.
25
Invoking the mantra of objectivity, the Court advised that "Eighth
Amendment judgments ... should be informed by objective factors to the
22. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 65 (2003) (5-4 decision); Solem v. Helm, 463
U.S. 277, 304 (1983) (5-4 decision); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 285 (1980) (5-4
decision); Ewing, 538 U.S. at 13 (plurality opinion); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 960 (plurality
opinion); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 370 (1982) (per curiam).
23. 445 U.S. at 274-76. Justice Stewart joined the majority opinion, but wrote a short
concurring paragraph critiquing and deferring to Texas's recidivist statute. Id. at 285 (Stewart,
J., concurring). Justice Powell, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, dissented. Id.
(Powell, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court affirmed an en banc decision of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals which vacated the panel decision and affirmed the original District Court
decision denying habeas relief based on Eighth Amendment proportionality. See Rummel v.
Estelle, 587 F.2d 651, 662 (5th Cir. 1978).
24. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 285-307 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 159-69
and accompanying text.
25. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 264-66 (majority opinion). Rummel's two prior crimes were
"fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80 worth of goods and services" in 1964, and
"passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36" in 1969. Id. at 265. His third, and triggering,
conviction was for "obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses" in 1973. Id. at 266. He had agreed to
repair an air conditioner, and accepted $120.75 in payment, but failed to do so. Id. at 286
(Powell, J., dissenting). The Texas recidivist statute provided that: "'[w]hoever shall have been
three times convicted of a felony less than capital shall on such third conviction be imprisoned




maximum possible extent., 26 It rejected Rummel's arguments based on the
nonviolent nature and low dollar value of his crime, asserting that the
absence or presence of violence was not determinative, and that
distinguishing between crimes of "$5,000, $50,000, or $500,000" was
inherently subjective.27 The Court also relied on arguments related to
legislative primacy, and referred to multiple penological goals and
federalism to support its conclusion.28
The Rummel dissent distilled objective factors from prior case law that
would minimize the risk of constitutionalizing the personal predilections of
federal judges; they included "(i) the nature of the offense, (ii) the sentence
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions, and (iii)
the sentence imposed upon other criminals in the same jurisdiction."29
Applying this framework, the dissent concluded that the offense was
relatively minor, and that inter- and intrajurisdictional reviews revealed
unconstitutional disproportionality. °
Hutto v. Davis mirrored the result in Rummel, but represented an
expansion of judicial deference in proportionality jurisprudence to a
nonrecidivist sentencing context. In Hutto, virtually the same majority of
five Justices, with O'Connor substituting for Stewart, reversed the circuit
court's grant of habeas relief.3" Justice Powell, who had dissented in
26. Id. at 274-75 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)); see also Rummel
v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1193, 1201-02 (5th Cir. 1978) (Thomberry, C.J., dissenting) ("No neutral
principle of adjudication permits a federal court to hold that in a given situation individual
crimes are too trivial in relation to the punishment imposed." (footnote omitted)), vacated on
reh'g, 587 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1978).
27. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 275-76.
28. See id. at 272-74, 281-84 (maintaining legislative prerogative to determine sentence
length, legitimacy of punishing recidivists more severely in pursuit of deterrence and
incapacitation, and federalism's abhorrence of "constitutionally imposed uniformity"); cf
Pamela S. Karlan, Exit Strategies in Constitutional Law: Lessons for Getting the Least
Dangerous Branch Out of the Political Thicket, 82 B.U. L. REv. 667, 695-96 (2002) (asserting
that the Rehnquist Court's exit strategy approach disengages but leaves open a path for future
re-engagement if circumstances warrant judicial involvement).
29. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 295 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
30. See id. (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(d)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1980)) (noting
legislature's reclassification of Rummel's third offense as a misdemeanor); see also id. at 296-
302 (reviewing other jurisdictions' habitual offender statutes, American Law Institute and
American Bar Association proposals, and Texas's more lenient sentencing of murder and rape
than a third-time petty theft).
31. 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) (per curiam). Justice Powell wrote a separate concurring
opinion, and Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, dissented. Id. at 375-88.
The tortuous procedural history of this case involved a grant of habeas relief by the District
Court; reversal by a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; rehearing en banc and
affirmance of habeas relief by the full Court of Appeals; a grant of certiorari and decision to
40:0527] 535
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Rummel, switched sides and concurred in Hutto based on stare decisis.
32
The Court's per curiam decision granted the State's petition for a writ of
certiorari, and by summary order reversed the judgment below and
remanded the case with instructions to dismiss. 33 The result was to uphold
Roger Trenton Davis's forty-year sentence for possession with intent to
distribute and distribution of approximately nine ounces of marijuana worth
about $200.34 Linking its concern about objectivity with deference to the
legislature and federalism, the Court relied heavily on Rummel in ruling
against Davis's proportionality claim. 35 Justice Brennan, in dissent, focused
on limitations to legislative deference, proposing a rule of greater deference
to recidivist sentencing schemes, and less deference in reviewing individual
sentences: the "general principle of deference .. . cannot justify the
complete abdication of our responsibility to enforce the Eighth
Amendment."
36
Having written the dissent in Rummel, and a concurrence in Hutto,
Justice Powell wrote for a five-member majority in Solem v. Helm, and held
that the challenged recidivist sentence was unconstitutionally
disproportionate. 37 Solem is the only one in this line of cases to find an
Eighth Amendment violation. 38 Justice Blackmun, who had been in the
vacate and remand in light of Rummel by the Supreme Court; and a second affirmance by the
Court of Appeals by an equally divided vote. See id. at 371-72.
32. See id. at 375, 377-80 (Powell, J., concurring) (reasoning that the instant offense was
more serious and the sentence less severe than in Rummel).
33. Id. at 375. The dissent strongly objected to the majority's decision to exercise the
"power of summary disposition," sidestepping full briefing and oral argument. Id. at 381, 386-
87 (Brennan, J., dissenting); ef Erwin Chemerinsky & Ned Miltenberg, The Need to Clarify the
Meaning of U.S. Supreme Court Remands: The Lessons of Punitive Damages' Cases, 36 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 513 (2004) (critiquing use of summary orders, granting certiorari, vacating the decision
below, and remanding for further consideration in light of recently decided cases).
34. Hutto, 454 U.S at 375; ef Frase, supra note 18, at 633 n.275 (suggesting that Davis's
racial identity as "an African American man in a rural Virginia community who had dared to
date white women and marry one" may have contributed to the forty-year sentence); Grossman,
supra note 20, at 120 n.80 (same).
35. See Hutto, 454 U.S. at 373-75 (asserting that Rummel had virtually conceded the
subjectivity of noncapital criminal sentencing and appropriateness of deference to legislatures,
and that federalism limited the usefulness of interjurisdictional review).
36. Id. at 383 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 377 (Powell, J., concurring) ("[O]ur
system of justice always has recognized that appellate courts do have a responsibility-
expressed in the proportionality principle-not to shut their eyes to grossly disproportionate
sentences that are manifestly unjust.").
37. 463 U.S. 277, 303-04 (1983). Chief Justice Burger wrote the dissenting opinion and
was joined by Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor.
38. In 1910, the Supreme Court held that a fifteen-year sentence of cadena temporal, a
punishment imposed by a Philippine Court that entailed wrist and ankle chains, hard labor, and
an assortment of lifetime civil disabilities, for the crime of falsifying government documents
violated the Eighth Amendment. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 364, 383 (1910);
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majority in the two prior decisions, switched sides. The decisive factor for
Powell and Blackmun appeared to be the possibility of objective
assessments of offense gravity and sentence severity.39 Although the
triggering crime was Solem's seventh felony,4" the Court held that a
sentence of life without possibility of parole for the triggering offense of
passing a bad check for $100 violated Eighth Amendment proportionality.a
The Court revived and established an objective three-part test for analyzing
proportionality and emphasized the importance of the judiciary's role as a
check on the legislature.42
Defining the first part of the test as a comparison of offense gravity and
sentence severity, the Solem Court characterized evaluation of the former as
an ordering task, and evaluation of the latter as a line-drawing task. 3
Identifying harm, culpability, and violence as relevant offense gravity
considerations, the Court posited that (1) "courts are competent to judge the
gravity of an offense, at least on a relative scale," and (2) "[c]omparisons
can be made in light of the harm caused or threatened to the victim or
society, and the culpability of the offender. '4 With respect to sentence
severity, the Court relied in part on the obvious ranking of penalties based
on the number of years of incarceration, and expressed confidence in the
ability of courts to make these judgments just as they "draw similar lines in
a variety of contexts., 45 Applying this framework, the Court held that
cf Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding that a state law making addiction
to narcotics a crime punishable by a minimum of ninety days imprisonment "inflicts a cruel and
unusual punishment").
39. Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-303.
40. The six prior convictions were for third-degree burglary in 1964, 1966, and 1969, for a
total of three third-degree burglary convictions; obtaining money under false pretenses in 1972;
grand larceny in 1973; and a felony driving while intoxicated conviction in 1975. Id. The
dissent maintained that Helm's actions underlying his convictions for the three burglaries and
drunk driving, had the potentiality for violent outcomes. Id. at 315-16 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
("It is sheer fortuity that the places [Helm] burglarized were unoccupied and that he killed no
pedestrians while behind the wheel.").
41. Id. at 281, 303 (uttering no account check is ordinarily punishable by a maximum
sentence of five years and a $5,000 fine).
42. Id. at 292-94.
43. See id. at 292-95.
44. Id. at 292-93. "[T]here are widely shared views as to the relative seriousness of
crimes." Id. (citing Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, The Seriousness of Crimes: Normative Structure
and Individual Differences, 39 AM. Soc. REv. 224, 237 (1974)). Solem contradicted Rummel in
terms of violence scaling, asserting that as "the criminal laws make clear, nonviolent crimes are
less serious than crimes marked by violence or the threat of violence." Id. at 292-93.
45. Id. at 294. The Court gave the following example: "It is clear that a 25-year sentence
generally is more severe than a 15-year sentence, but in most cases it would be difficult to
decide that the former violates the Eighth Amendment while the latter does not." Id.; cf Barker
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972) (holding that Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial
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Helm's triggering offense involved neither violence nor threatened
violence, and a relatively small amount of money.46 Additionally, Helm's
life sentence without possibility of parole, unlike Rummel's, which allowed
for parole within twelve years, was "the most severe punishment that the
State could have imposed on any criminal for any crime., 47 The Solem
Court conducted an intra- and interjurisdictional review and concluded that
"objective criteria" had revealed significant disproportionality.48
Eight years later in Harmelin v. Michigan,4 9 with Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, and Souter substituting for Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Powell and Brennan respectively, down was up again. Justice Scalia, joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, asserted for the first time that there is no Eighth
Amendment proportionality requirement in noncapital cases.5" Justice
Kennedy wrote a plurality opinion upholding a legislatively mandated
permits some delay, but must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis); Baldwin v. New York, 399
U.S. 66, 69 (1970) (holding that Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial attaches when defendant
faces more than six months imprisonment).
46. Solem, 463 U.S. at 296 (citing Rossi, supra note 44, at 229) (explaining that theft is
"viewed by society as among the less serious offenses"). The Court compared Helm's crime of
writing a $100 check against a nonexistent account to "taking $ 100 from a cash register....
defrauding someone of $100, or obtaining $100 through extortion, or blackmail, or using a false
credit card to obtain $100, or embezzling $100." Id. at 296 n.20 (citations omitted).
Nevertheless, any of these other crimes would have been classified as a misdemeanor, rather
than a felony. Id. "Curiously, under South Dakota law there is no distinction between writing a
no account check for a large sum and writing a no account check for a small sum." Id.
47. Id. at 297. At the time Helm was sentenced, South Dakota did not authorize capital
punishment. Id. "Barring executive clemency, Helm will spend the rest of his life in the state
penitentiary." Id. (citation omitted).
48. Id. at 303 (reasoning that "Helm had received the penultimate penalty for relatively
minor criminal conduct," and a harsher sentence than "other criminals in the State who have
committed more serious crimes" and than he would have received "in any other jurisdiction,
with the possible exception of a single State"). But see id. at 312-14 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(criticizing the Court's failure to follow or overrule directly controlling cases, and asserting that
sentences imposed for different crimes are essentially arbitrary).
49. 501 U.S. 957 (1991). Justice Scalia wrote the opinion of the Court and was joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 961 (Scalia, J.). Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment, and was joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter. Id. at 996
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). There were three dissenting
opinions. Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Blackmun and
Stevens. Id. at 1009 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion, id. at
1027 (Marshall, J., dissenting), and Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion and was joined
by Justice Blackmun, id. at 1027-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50. See id. at 981-85 (Scalia, J.) (asserting that the Eighth Amendment prohibited
particular modes of punishment, like burning at the stake, but did not require proportionality
between crime and punishment). In other words, cruelty and unusualness should be determined
solely with reference to the punishment at issue "('Is life imprisonment a cruel and unusual
punishment?')," not with reference to the crime for which it is imposed as well "('Is life
imprisonment cruel and unusual punishment for possession of unlawful drugs?')." Id. at 976.
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sentence of life without parole for Ronald Allen Harmelin, a first-time
offender convicted of possessing 672 grams of cocaine. 1 This time Justice
White, who had been in the majority in Rummel and Hutto, and the dissent
in Solem, switched sides and dissented along with Blackmun, Stevens, and
Marshall.52
Reaffirming the existence of a proportionality principle,53 Kennedy's
opinion in Harmelin modified the three-part test outlined in Solem,
privileging the first Solem factor such that "intrajurisdictional and
interjurisdictional analyses are appropriate only in the rare case in which a
threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed
leads to an inference of gross disproportionality."54 Kennedy also culled
five principles to guide proportionality analysis: legislative primacy,55
penological pluralism,56  federalism,57  objective factors,58  and gross
51. See id. at 961-62 & n.1 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.7214(a)(iv),
333.7403(2)(a)(i), 791.233b[1](b), 791.234(4) (West Supp. 1990-1991)) (statute required
mandatory life sentence for possession of 650 grams or more, with no parole eligibility if
convicted of major controlled substance offense).
52. Id. at 1018-20 (White, J., dissenting) (critiquing the Court's failure to consider
"objective factors [like] 'the historical development of the punishment at issue, legislative
judgments, international opinion, and the sentencing decisions juries have made' (quoting
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982))).
53. See id. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see
also Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("'[H]olding of the Court may be viewed
as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds."' (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976))).
54. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). Thus, consideration of all three factors is not required in every case. Kennedy
harmonized the cases, reasoning that Solem and Weems contained comparative analyses because
the sentence imposed appeared to be grossly excessive in relation to the crime committed, but
that Rummel and Hutto upheld the challenged sentences without conducting comparative
analyses because the threshold analysis of offense gravity and sentence severity was sufficient
to determine constitutionality. See id. at 1005. But cf id. at 1020 (White, J., dissenting)
("[A]bandonment of the second and third factors set forth in Solem makes any attempt at an
objective proportionality analysis futile.").
55. See id. at 998 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[T]he
fixing of prison terms for specific crimes involves a substantive penological judgment that, as a
general matter, is 'properly within the province of legislatures, not courts."' (quoting Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275-76 (1980))).
56. See id. at 999 ("[C]ompeting theories of mandatory and discretionary sentencing have
been in varying degrees of ascendancy or decline since the beginning of the Republic." (citing
United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45-47 (1978))).
57. See id. at 1000 ("[D]iffering attitudes and perceptions of local conditions may yield
different, yet rational, conclusions regarding the appropriate length of prison terms for particular
crimes.").
58. See id. at 1000 ("[P]roportionality review.., should be informed by 'objective factors
to the maximum possible extent."' (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274-75)).
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disproportionality.5 Although life without possibility of parole was the
second most severe sentence permitted by law, Kennedy ranked possession
of more than 650 grams of cocaine as high on the offense gravity scale.6"
Since "a comparison of [Harmelin's] crime with his sentence d[id] not give
rise to an inference of gross disproportionality," no intrajurisdictional or
interjurisdictional analysis was required.6'
Twelve years after Harmelin, in Ewing v. California,62 and Lockyer v.
Andrade,63 down stayed up, and the Court rejected two proportionality
challenges under California's three-strikes recidivist sentencing statute. 64 In
Ewing, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, who had replaced Justice
Marshall, wrote separate concurring opinions maintaining there is no
proportionality requirement.65 Chief Justice Rehnquist remained on the
same side, but switched positions, leaving Scalia and joining Justice
59. Id. at 1001 (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288, 303 (1983)).
60. Id. at 1002-04 ("Possession, use, and distribution of illegal drugs represent 'one of the
greatest problems affecting the health and welfare of our population."' (quoting Treasury
Employees v. Van Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989))). But see id. at 1025 (White, J., dissenting)
(finding it troubling that the State "chose not to prosecute Harmelin under the statute prohibiting
possession with intent to deliver, because it was 'not necessary and not prudent to make it more
difficult for us to win a prosecution"' (quoting Transcript of Oral Arg. 30-31, Harmelin, 501
U.S. 957 (No. 89-7272))).
61. Id. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Kennedy
distinguished the Solem Court's invalidation of one jurist's decision to sentence at the top of the
legislatively authorized sentencing range, see id. at 1006, from Harmelin where "the Michigan
legislature has mandated the penalty and has given the state judge no discretion in implementing
it." Id. ("[L]egislature has the power to define criminal punishments without giving the courts
any sentencing discretion." (citing Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 (1991))); see
also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363-65 (1989) (mandatory sentencing scheme)).
62. 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
63. 538 U.S. 63 (2003). Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion of the Court and was joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Id. at 66. Justice Souter
wrote a dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id. at 77.
64. California's three strikes law requires that a defendant convicted of a felony receive
double the sentence ordinarily imposed if s/he had one prior serious or violent felony
conviction, and receive an indeterminate term of life imprisonment if s/he had two or more prior
serious or violent felony convictions. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 15-16 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE ANN.
§§ 667.5, 667(e)(1), 667(e)(2)(A) (West 1999); §§ 1192.7, 1170.12(c)(1), 1170.12(c)(2)(A)
(West Supp. 2002)). Indeterminate life sentences include the possibility of parole "calculated
by reference to a 'minimum term,' which is the greater of (a) three times the term otherwise
provided for the current conviction, (b) 25 years, or (c) the term determined by the court
pursuant to § 1170 for the underlying conviction, including any enhancements." Id. (citing CAL.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 667(e)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) (West 1999); § 1 170.12(c)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) (West Supp.
2002)).




O'Connor's plurality opinion along with Justice Kennedy.66 With four prior
felonies, Gary Ewing received a minimum of twenty-five years to life for
felony grand theft of three golf clubs worth $399 each.67 Theft of these
clubs was a "wobbler" offense, which meant it could have been classified as
either a felony or misdemeanor, but the prosecutor and trial judge decided
to treat it as a felony third strike.68
O'Connor's singular focus on legislative primacy distorted her
application of the modified Solem test.69 Relying on the "longstanding
tradition of deferring to state legislatures" for making the difficult policy
choices that underlie any criminal sentencing scheme, she failed to delineate
any boundaries for such deference. 7' The plurality concluded that Ewing's
offense gravity level was high based on the seriousness of felony grand
theft of approximately $1,200 of merchandise, 7' and his long history of
felony recidivism.72 With respect to sentence severity, while recognizing
66. Id. at 11 (plurality opinion). Justices Stevens and Breyer wrote separate dissenting
opinions and joined each other's opinions along with Justices Souter and Ginsburg. Id. at 32
(Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 35 (Breyer, J., dissenting). By 2003, Justices White and
Blackmun had also been replaced by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer respectively. With Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito substituting for Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor
in 2005 and 2006, the future of proportionality analysis in noncapital criminal sentencing is
potentially even more unstable than it has been thus far.
67. Id. at 16-20 (plurality opinion). Approximately six years before he stole the golf clubs,
"Ewing committed three burglaries and one robbery at a Long Beach, California, apartment
complex over a 5-week period." Id. at 18. During the ten years prior to the Long Beach
burglaries and robbery, Ewing had been convicted of theft, felony grand theft (later reduced to a
misdemeanor), petty theft, battery, burglary, possessing drug paraphernalia, appropriating lost
property, and unlawfully possessing a firearm and trespassing. See id.
68. See id. at 16-17, 29-30 (reasoning that felony treatment was justified in light of state
court precedent and Ewing's criminal history). Although wobblers are presumptively felonies,
both prosecutors and trial courts have discretion to charge or treat them as misdemeanors. Id. at
16-17 (citing People v. Williams, 163 P.2d 692, 696 (Cal. 1945)). "[T]rial courts may avoid
imposing a three strikes sentence ... by reducing 'wobblers' to misdemeanors (which do not
qualify as triggering offenses)." Id. at 17.
69. See id. at 24-28 (describing three-strikes law as reflective of a national sentencing
"sea change" and bolstering its legitimacy by citing public referendum, State Assembly and
State Senate voting margins).
70. Id. at 12, 28 ("It is enough that the State of California has a reasonable basis for
believing that dramatically enhanced sentences for habitual felons 'advance[s] the goals of [its]
criminal justice system in any substantial way."' (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 297
(1983))).
71. See id. at 28 (noting "'seriousness' of grand theft in the context of proportionality
review" (citing In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921, 936 n.20 (Cal. 1972))). "Theft of $1,200 in property
is a felony under federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 641, and in the vast majority of States." Id.
72. Id. at 29. In addition to punishing the triggering offense, the legislature had an interest
in "dealing in a harsher manner with those who by repeated criminal acts have shown that they
are simply incapable of conforming to the norms of society as established by its criminal law."
Id. (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 276 (1980)).
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that twenty-five years to life is a long sentence, O'Connor reasoned that "it
reflects a rational legislative judgment, entitled to deference, that offenders
who have committed serious or violent felonies and who continue to
commit felonies must be incapacitated."73 Concluding that Ewing's
sentence had failed the threshold test for gross disproportionality, the
plurality held that it passed constitutional muster without conducting an
inter- or intrajurisdictional review.74
Justice O'Connor wrote again in Lockyer, this time for a five-member
majority.75 She framed the issue narrowly as a question of the appropriate
standard of review in a state habeas case: whether the court decision was
"contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal
law."76 Leandro Andrade had been sentenced as a recidivist to two
consecutive terms of twenty-five years to life for stealing five videotapes on
one occasion and four more videotapes two weeks later, with a total value
of approximately $150. 7 Although the triggering crimes for the combined
fifty-year sentence, two petty theft with a prior conviction offenses, were
"wobbler" offenses,78 the prosecutor chose to charge Andrade with two
felony theft counts, and the trial court denied his motion to reduce the
charges to misdemeanors.79
73. Id. at 30.
74. See id. at 30-31. But see id. at 42 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (concluding, based on length
of real sentence and objective data indicating low offense gravity, that Ewing's claim "must
pass the threshold test ... [which] must permit arguably unconstitutional sentences, not only
actually unconstitutional sentences, to pass the threshold"); cf id. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring)
("[Plurality opinion], in all fairness, does not convincingly establish that 25-years-to-life is a
'proportionate' punishment for stealing three golf clubs....
75. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 66 (2003).
76. Id. The California appellate court had upheld the sentence under Rummel, and the
California Supreme Court and Federal District Court both denied Andrade's petitions for
review. Id. at 68-69. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that "the state
court's 'disregard for Solem result[ed] in an unreasonable application of clearly established
Supreme Court law,'" and "constitut[ed] 'clear error.'" Id. (quoting Andrade v. Attorney Gen.,
270 F.3d 743, 766-67 (9th Cir. 2001)).
77. Id. at 66. Prior to his arrest in November 1995 for the videotape theft, Andrade had
been convicted of a misdemeanor theft, three counts of first-degree residential burglary,
transportation of marijuana, another misdemeanor petty theft, and escape from federal prison.
See id. at 66-67. Andrade's presentence report revealed that he reported being addicted to
heroin since 1977, approximately five years before his first criminal offense, and that he stole to
buy heroin. Id.
78. Id. at 67. "Under California law petty theft with a prior conviction is a so-called
'wobbler' offense because it is punishable either as a misdemeanor or as a felony." Id. (citing
CAL. PENAL CODE § 666 (West Supp. 2002)).
79. See id. at 67-68. "[T]he jury made a special finding that Andrade was convicted of
three counts of first-degree residential burglary," meeting the requirement that a recidivist
offender have at least two serious or violent felonies that serve as qualifying offenses under the
three strikes regime. Id. at 68.
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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Acknowledging the difficulty of determining what constitutes clearly
established law in proportionality review,0 the Court nevertheless cited the
"one governing legal principle [that] emerges . . . : A gross
disproportionality principle is applicable to sentences for terms of years.'
Reasoning that this principle "gives legislatures broad discretion" in
fashioning sentences, and that its "'precise contours' . . . [are] 'unclear,"' it
held that the state appellate court's affirmance of the sentence was not
contrary to clearly established federal law nor objectively unreasonable.82 In
dissent, Justice Souter maintained that Andrade's offense of stealing $150
worth of children's videotapes from Kmart was closely analogous to that of
the defendant in Solem who wrote a bad check for $100.83 "[B]ecause
Andrade was 37 years old when sentenced," Souter concluded that "his 50-
year [minimum sentence] amounts to life without parole."84 Even under an
incapacitation justification, the proportionality of a second twenty-five-year
sentence for stealing four videotapes worth $68.84 "does not raise a
seriously debatable point on which judgments might reasonably differ.
8 5
Souter concluded that "[t]his is the rare sentence of demonstrable gross
disproportionality . . . [and] [i]f Andrade's sentence is not grossly
disproportionate, the principle has no meaning."86
80. See id. at 72 ("Indeed, in determining whether a particular sentence for a term of years
can violate the Eighth Amendment, we have not established a clear or consistent path for courts
to follow."); see also id. at 76-77 (recognizing that some members of the Court have expressed
"'uncertainty about how our cases dealing with the punishment of recidivists should apply'
(quoting Riggs v. California, 525 U.S. 1114, 1115 (1999) (Stevens, J., joined by Souter &
Ginsburg, JJ., respecting denial of certiorari))).
81. Id. at 72.
82. Id. at 76 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 998 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
83. Id. at 78 (Souter, J., dissenting). O'Connor focused on the fact that there were two
triggering offenses, see id. at 74 n.1 (majority opinion), but Souter maintained that Andrade's
sentence could "only be understood as punishment for the total amount he stole," and supported
this assertion with the short two-week interval between the thefts, the single corporate victim,
the single motivation to purchase drugs, and the single indictment, see id. at 78-79 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). Both Andrade and the defendant in Solem were repeat offenders, and neither had
committed violent crimes or crimes against the person. Id. at 78.
84. Id. at 79 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 287 (1983)). But
see id. at 74 n. 1 (majority opinion) (asserting that Andrade's age could not be a determinative
factor because "[t]wo different sentences do not become materially indistinguishable based
solely upon the age of the persons sentenced").
85. Id. at 82 (Souter, J., dissenting). In her majority opinion, Justice O'Connor noted that
based on a California Supreme Court case decided after his conviction and sentence, People v.
Garcia, 976 P.2d 831 (Cal. 1999), Andrade may "'file another State habeas corpus petition'
arguing that he should serve only one term of 25 years to life in prison because 'sentencing
courts have a right to dismiss strikes on a count-by-count basis."' Id. at 68 (majority opinion)
(quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Lockyer, 538 U.S. 63 (No. 01-1127)).
86. Id. at 82 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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The Court's five proportionality principles and threshold test have
allowed, and perhaps encouraged, courts to conduct a mechanical analysis,
in which some principles are recited along with some facts, and the
conclusions are then assumed. Instead, courts should be articulating the
reasoning underlying their proportionality judgments, explicitly naming the
factors they considered and the facts they found to be dispositive. This kind
of transparency would help to sharpen the analytic process and would not
be contrary to existing law. The silver lining to the confusion in Supreme
Court precedent is that it leaves room for reinvigorating Eighth Amendment
proportionality in noncapital criminal sentencing. Scholars have already
begun the work of unpacking proportionality, and my proposal is predicated
on their insights.
II. DISTANCE BETWEEN COMMENTATORS AND COURTS
The law review literature on Eighth Amendment proportionality is vast,
with scholars focusing on the topic through a variety of lenses ranging from
doctrinal and historical to philosophical, from quantitative and empirical to
economic, and from criminology, sociology, and psychology to comparative
law and international law. Even within the relatively narrower slice of
doctrinally based approaches, Eighth Amendment proportionality applies in
multiple contexts, such as the death penalty, punitive damages, excessive
fines and bail, modes of punishment, and proportionality between
noncapital offenses and sentences in terms of years.
Critiques of the law of proportionality in noncapital sentencing also take
a variety of forms that consider questions such as institutional competence
to determine sentence length, the political process that results in various
sentence lengths, and the theoretical justifications for punishing varying
offenses with varying sentence lengths. Of the smaller subset of
commentators who address proportionality in noncapital criminal
sentencing, none explicitly work within the context of the modified Solem
test and five principles, and none have developed concrete guidelines for
conducting the offense gravity and sentence severity analysis required under
the first part of the Solem test. I seek to work in the gap between the
analytical and theoretical work done by these scholars and the work of
courts, lawyers, and litigants on real cases.
The law review literature most relevant to my focus on sharpening the
analytical process within the first Solem factor falls roughly into three
categories: one that analyzes Supreme Court precedent and suggests
remedial approaches, one that draws on the social sciences and notions of
human rights for organizing precepts to guide proportionality analysis, and
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one that delves into the theoretical justifications for punishment to create
limits on proportionality analysis. Each of the scholars whose work I
discuss below has recognized the lack of coherence in the theory and
practice of applying the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment in noncapital cases, and each has sought to clarify this
area of jurisprudence. My proposal is built on their work as well as within
the confines of Supreme Court precedent.
A. Court-Focused Approaches
As experienced Supreme Court litigators, Pamela Karlan and Erwin
Chemerinsky both approach proportionality from a perspective that places
the Court at the center of their analyses. Karlan characterizes the process of
evaluating proportionality in criminal punishment as "pricking the lines,"
describing the difficulty with "translating the principle into a standard for
judicial oversight."87 She frames the question as one of mediating between
the judiciary and the legislature, and determining when courts can trump
legislatures.88 Karlan outlines three potential categories of judicial review:
low, medium, and high, but does not advocate for a particular approach.89
87. Karlan, supra note 11, at 882-83. The uncertain pattern created by these pricks has
resulted from the Rehnquist Court's "exit strategy" of "refining the constitutional test in a way
that 'preserves the Court's ability to reenter the field should circumstances or doctrine or the
Justices' view of the Constitution change,' while essentially foreclosing relief in contemporary
cases." Id. at 884 (quoting Karlan, supra note 28, at 687).
88. See id. at 889. In most circumstances, the "'clearest and most reliable objective
evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures."' Id.
(quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002)). Not every legislated sentence, however,
meets and thus defines the contours of Eighth Amendment proportionality. Courts, in their role
as interpreters of constitutional limits, must on occasion check legislatures. Cf Packer, supra
note 4, at 1074 (describing standard as "whether a legislatively prescribed proportion between
crime and punishment is rationally sustainable").
89. See Karlan, supra note 11, at 890-92. The first, modest review would be a form of
statutory review, "interven(ing] to strike the balance the legislature would have intended had it
been faced with a particular defendant's case." Id. at 890. The second would check legislative
enactments that had been skewed by political processes and thus did not accurately reflect
contemporary values. Id. at 889-92, 890 n.64 (citing David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and
Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1283, 1296-98 (1995) (classic account of political pressures
on legislators to rachet up sentences)); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal
Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 529-42 (2001) (focusing on tacit cooperation between prosecutors
and legislators, each of whom benefits from more and broader crimes, and growing
marginalization of judges, who alone are likely to opt for narrower liability rules). The third
expansive review would entail a judicial trump over the legislature and community even when a
particular statute provides clear or reliable evidence of a community's view. Karlan, supra note
11, at 892. This review is more common with questions of criminalizing conduct as opposed to
calibrating sentences. See id. at 892-93 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
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Chemerinsky calls for "a unified, coherent theory of constitutional limits on
punishment," that encompasses imprisonment as well as the death penalty,
fines, and punitive damages. 90 He seeks to bring the ends to the middle,
tightening the errantly loose proportionality review of noncapital criminal
sentences, and relaxing the overly stringent proportionality review of
punitive damages.91 With respect to proportionality in noncapital criminal
sentencing, Chemerinsky's specific proposal is for application of the
functional equivalent of all three Solem factors in all cases.92
My proposal adopts Karlan's high level of judicial proportionality
review because the information and perspective that judges have about the
individual costs of prison sentences has been marginalized in the public
debate, and their expertise in applying general rules to specific facts
underutilized.93 Legislatures obviously could and do on occasion obtain this
information from judges, but are under no obligation to do so. Regardless of
individual judges' political affiliations or subjective views on crime and
punishment, multiple explanations of the justness, appropriateness, and
constitutionality of sentences imposed in individual cases have value in and
of themselves. Ideally, there would be a diversity of experiences and views
in the judiciary that could inform and shape our nation's criminal justice
(consensual sodomy); City of Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 45-48, 64 (1999) (loitering);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (interracial marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (use of contraception)).
90. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1049, 1051
(2004); cf Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the
Debate over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1147, 1165 (2004) (recognizing
general Eighth Amendment requirement that "'punishment for crime should be graduated and
proportioned to the offense' (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002))); Lee,
supra note 20, at 678-79 (outlining four categories of Eighth Amendment cases: type of
punishment, proportionality of punishment, procedure for punishment, and administration of
punishment); Adam M. Gershowitz, Note, The Supreme Court's Backwards Proportionality
Jurisprudence: Comparing Judicial Review of Excessive Criminal Punishments and Excessive
Punitive Damages Awards, 86 VA. L. REv. 1249, 1252-55 (2000) (critiquing Court's stringent
proportionality review for punitive damages and deferential proportionality review for terms of
imprisonment).
91. See Chemerinsky, supra note 90, at 1076-79.
92. See id. (describing three factors as reprehensibility, penalties in other states, and other
penalties in that state). Chermerinsky relies on the precept that: "In defining a role for the
courts, there is far more need for judicial protection of prisoners, a group with no political
power or influence, than of businesses." See id. at 1066 (citing JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST (1980)); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Cruel and Unusual: The Story of Leandro
Andrade, 52 DRAKE L. REv. 1, 4 (2003) ("It is cruel and unusual punishment, a violation of the
Eighth Amendment, to sentence a person to life in prison for committing a minor offense.").
93. See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 89, at 540-42 (discussing the growing marginalization of
judges).
[Ariz. St. L.J.
RES USCITA TING PROPORTIONALITY
system. This would be particularly true if judges were given specific
guidance and addressed the same questions in multiple factual contexts.94
In contrast to Chemerinsky's proposal regarding universal application of
his three proportionality factors, I focus more narrowly on sharpening
application of the first Solem factor. 95 I additionally would be hesitant to
discard the punitive to compensatory damages ratio analysis, as he suggests,
because I believe a similar approach to examining proportionality in
recidivist sentencing may be helpful.96 As Karlan observes, the Justices of
the Supreme Court seem to be committed to a judicially enforceable
proportionality principle, and yet reluctant to look outward through intra-
and interjurisdictional review, or to look inward to their own understandings
of offense gravity and sentence severity.97 My proposal is grounded in
precedent requiring a threshold assessment of proportionality between
offense gravity and sentence severity. I offer overarching principles that
complement those identified by the Court, and concrete assessment tools
that could enable courts to look inward in a more structured, and transparent
way. My proposal has the potential to make the lines being pricked more
clearly visible and more strongly drawn.
94. Sentencing decisions could be sorted into easy, medium, and hard cases with the
majority falling into the easy category. Cf Frase, supra note 18, at 631 (proposing three
categories of penalties, "(1) noncustodial and short to medium-length custody terms; (2) lengthy
custodial terms; and (3) death sentences," with three different proportionality tests). Thus, a
detailed, articulated analysis would not be required in every case. The threshold, however, must
be set low enough that some significant portion of cases are adjudicated in a transparent way. A
properly applied threshold test could relieve courts of an unnecessary burden in easy cases
while requiring rigorous analysis in mid-level and hard cases. Cf Donna H. Lee, The Law of
Typicality: Examining the Procedural Due Process Implications of Sandin v. Conner, 72
FORDHAM L. REv. 785, 807-08 (2004) (describing Justice Breyer's categorization of easy, mid-
level, and hard cases in a prisoner's due process rights context).
95. Having switched in Harmelin to a threshold test without explicitly overruling or
modifying Solem, see Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 962-96 (1991), the Supreme Court
could potentially switch back to a true three-part test requiring intra- and interjurisdictional
review in every instance. Given the current composition of the Court, however, this seems
unlikely.
96. See Chemerinsky, supra note 90, at 1077-78. Chemerinsky himself notes that the
maximum sentence Andrade could have received for two counts of petty theft with one prior
offense was three years and eight months, but that under California's recidivist sentencing
scheme he received life with no parole eligibility for fifty years. Id. at 1063. This results in a
ratio of 16:1, as compared to the 9:1 ratio endorsed in punitive damages cases. Id.
97. Karlan, supra note 11, at 898; see also DRESSLER, supra note 17, at 62 ("Ironically,
therefore, the courts will now apply the least objective test of the three, and will only resort to




Drawing on the methodology and concepts of psychology, and of
philosophy and international human rights, respectively, Paul Robinson and
Markus Dubber focus more broadly on policy questions raised by
proportionality in noncapital criminal sentencing. Robinson and John
Darley have designed and used social science research to describe
community views on punishment, which they maintain should guide
sentencing policies and practices.98 They maintain that punishment should
be imposed in accordance with desert principles because imposing
excessively long sentences, as measured by lay intuitions of justice,
undermines the development of normative social values and, ultimately,
crime control.99 A felt sense of justice is related to desert principles,
although I propose relying on courts to determine where a threshold
retributivist line should be drawn in individual cases.
Robinson's structural analysis of sentencing decisions also informs my
proposal. He and Barbara Spellman analyze the strengths and weaknesses of
various sentencing decisionmakers (judges, juries, legislatures, sentencing
commissions, and parole boards),0 0 and segment sentencing decisions into
six distinct phases, including determining punishment amount.0 1 They
assert that judges and sentencing commissioners have comparable training
and expertise in applying decisional rules to facts and making normative
98. See generally PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY & BLAME
(1995) (comparing lay intuitions of justice with criminal codes); Paul H. Robinson, Testing Lay
Intuitions of Justice: How and Why?, 28 HOFSTRA L. REv. 611, 613 (2000) ("[C]riminal law's
moral credibility is essential to effective crime control."); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley,
The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 453, 456 (1997) [hereinafter Robinson & Darley,
Utility of Desert] (advocating assignment of "liability and punishment according to the
principles of justice that the community intuitively uses").
99. See Robinson & Darley, Utility of Desert, supra note 98, at 471-77. "Internalized
moral rules and social norms that are enforced by community sanctions are important sources of
compliance with the moral prohibitions of the community." Id. at 476; see also Paul H.
Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, 114
HARv. L. REv. 1429, 1444 (2001) [hereinafter Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness] ("As
criminal liability is increasingly disconnected from moral blameworthiness, the criminal law
can exercise less moral authority to change norms or to cause the internalization of norms ....
[U]sing the criminal justice system as a mechanism for preventive detention may undercut the
very crime prevention goal that is offered to justify such use."); Robinson, supra note 98, at
611-13 (explaining importance of lay intuitions of justice in the formation of social norms and
prohibitions whose internalization is "what cause[s] people to obey the law").
100. Paul H. Robinson & Barbara A. Spellman, Sentencing Decisions: Matching the
Decisionmaker to the Decision Nature, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1125, 1132 (2005).
101. Id. at 1130-31. His six decision points are policymaking, rule articulations,
factfinding, judgment-making, determining punishment amount, and determining punishment
method. See id. at 1128-32.
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judgments about facts, but that "[t]he more detailed the rules, the more
efficient it is to rely upon a single sentencing judge to implement them. The
less detailed the rules, the greater the need for a sentencing commission to
apply them in the individual case."' 2 My proposal outlines more detailed
rules for application of the first Solem factor, but less for the purpose of
efficiency than because such a system would leverage the expertise of
judges in decisionmaking within individual cases." 3
Where Robinson focuses on the function of sentencing, Dubber focuses
on its morality. Dubber seeks to import a principle of human dignity to
anchor Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis:
[C]onstitutional law of ... punishment requires . . recognizing
this fundamental principle ... and working out its implications for
the criminal process... from the definition of norms (the realm of
substantive criminal law) to their application (the domain of
procedural criminal law) to their enforcement (the sphere of prison
law). 104
Noting the long recognized dichotomy between the absence of meaningful
constitutional constraints on substantive criminal law and the thoroughly
constitutionalized procedural criminal law,"0 5 Dubber maintains that human
dignity "is not a dignity that is bestowed upon persons, either by other
102. Id. at 1148 ("To the extent that the task requires the exercise of judgment, a small
group may have the advantage, including greater uniformity in application and access to a wider
variety of views in decisionmaking."). Paul Robinson served as a voting member of the United
States Sentencing Commission from 1986-1988, resigning on February 1, 1988 before the end
of his term. See U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Former Commissioners of the United States
Sentencing Commission, http://www.ussc.gov/general/Oldcomms.htm (last visited Apr. 3,
2008). Robinson was the lone dissenter when the federal sentencing guidelines were first
promulgated in November 1987. See Paul H. Robinson, Dissent from the United States
Sentencing Commission's Proposed Guidelines, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1112, 1112-13
(1986).
103. Whereas Robinson and Darley "envision code-drafting being done by commissions of
lawyers, criminal law experts, and social scientists," Robinson & Darley, Utility of Desert,
supra note 98, at 488, I envision state and federal court judges making proportionality decisions
in individual cases. I focus on common law rather than positive law, and would use the moral
intuitions of the community to inform rather than direct judicial decisionmaking. See Douglas
A. Berman, A Common Law for This Age of Federal Sentencing: The Opportunity and Need for
Judicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 93, 98 (1999) (advocating that federal judges
take a larger role in developing sentencing law).
104. Markus Dirk Dubber, Toward a Constitutional Law of Crime and Punishment, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 509, 514 (2004).
105. Id. at 509 & n. 1 (citing Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive
Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1269 (1998); Claire Finkelstein, Positivism and the Notion of
an Offense, 88 CAL. L. REV. 335 (2000); Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An
Opinionated Review, 87 CAL. L. REV. 943 (1999); William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and
the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1(1996)).
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persons or by 'the state' or 'society' or some community or other... it is a
moral, as opposed to an ethical or political, property.""1 6
Dubber posits that international human rights law and philosophy form a
more solid foundation for constitutional criminal law, characterizing
traditional legal analysis as a nearly senseless search for oracular signs from
the U.S. Supreme Court. 10 7 He traces some of the practice and theory of
human dignity from the Preamble of the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights to the 1971 publication of John Rawls's A Theory of
Justice.0 8 Making the connection between human dignity and punishment,
Dubber states that "the very nature of 'governments' as guarantors of rights
both grounds, and constrains, the state's power to punish .... [I]t imposes
upon the state a general requirement of proportionality of crime and
punishment."'' 9
As with Robinson's desert principle, Dubber's concept of human dignity
can inform a felt sense of justice: "[P]roportionality is ... a fundamental
principle of justice that emanates directly from the state's essential duty to
protect the personal right of its constituents." 0 Developing a normative,
retributivist touchstone for proportionality judgments under this rubric
demands more from courts than encouraging a judicial process that is
106. Id. at 515. Dubber compares his thesis regarding constitutional criminal law within the
United States with law from other countries and international law. See id. at 516 & nn.35 & 36
(citing Part I, § 12 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch.
11 (U.K.); R. v. Smith, [1987] S.C.R. 1045, 1049 (proscribing punishments degrading to human
dignity); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
art. 5(1), opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953)
(guaranteeing a right to liberty and security)).
107. See id. at 528; see also id. at n.78 ("'The basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man."' (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100
(1958))). While recognizing the value of creating an independent, affirmative account of the
substantive law of proportionality as it should be, unburdened by the governing law as it is, my
proposal takes a more incremental approach to try to effect change in the short term, in real
cases.
108. Id. at 534 (citing Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N.
GAOR, 3d session, 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948)); see also JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971) (explaining that a veil of ignorance would probably require
proportionality in sentencing).
109. Id. at 538; see also id. at 537-38 ("[H]aving principally induced men to enter into
society" by agreeing to secure enjoyment of their lives, liberties and property, government must
punish those who violate this enjoyment." (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, A BILL FOR
PROPORTIONING CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS, in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 90-91 (Saul K.
Padover ed., 1943) (1779))). Once "punish[ed] in proportion to his offence, [the offender] is
entitled to ... protection from all greater pain, so that it becomes a duty in the legislature to
arrange in a proper scale the crimes which it may be necessary for them to repress, and to adjust
thereto a corresponding gradation of punishments." Id. at 538 (quoting JEFFERSON, supra, at 91).
110. Id. at 538.
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transparent and that assumes the decisionmaking responsibility required by
a principle of limited deference. I propose, as a first step towards this more
ambitious goal, that courts recognize the legitimacy and importance of a
"felt sense of justice" and begin to name the implicit retributivist strands in
their individual, contextualized decisions. The work of scholars like
Robinson and Dubber could help to add substantive content to the process
that I suggest.
C. Theoretical Approaches
Like the interdisciplinary approaches discussed above, the following
theoretical approaches provide additional support for a variation of limited
retributivism that I have framed as a felt sense of justice. The criminal law
theories of retributivism, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation are
axiomatic justifications for punishment.'11 In terms of proportionality,
retributivism focuses on the past, already committed offense, and
utilitarianism focuses on preventing future harm by deterring,
incapacitating, and rehabilitating the offender and other potential
offenders. 12 Retributivism assesses the offender's past actions and
evaluates blameworthiness, as measured by the nature and seriousness of
the harm and the offender's degree of culpability." 3 Utilitarianism's
forward-looking perspective links punishment to predictions of future harm
and values punishment based on the resulting net benefit to society. 14
To counter the Supreme Court's acceptance of any one of the traditional
punishment justifications as sufficient to support a prison sentence,
Youngjae Lee proposes a theory of retributivism as a side constraint.11 5
Under this theory, "multiple purposes of punishment may be pursued so
long as no sentence that is undeservedly harsh is imposed."'"16 Retributivism
111. See DRESSLER, supra note 17, at 13-18; see also Packer, supra note 4, at 1079
(describing retribution and the utilitarian propensity to prevent or diminish the commission of
offenses through deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, or some combination of these as the
justifications for punishment).
112. See DRESSLER, supra note 17, at 54-55.
113. Frase, supra note 18, at 590; see also Lee, supra note 20, at 700 (asserting that
retributivism is based on the general intuition that the seriousness of the crime should match the
harshness of the penalty).
114. DRESSLER, supra note 17, at 54-55.
115. Lee, supra note 20, at 683. Lee coins the phrase "disjunctive theory" to describe what
I have labeled penological pluralism. See id. at 682 ("[A] sentence is not unconstitutionally
excessive as long as it can be justified under any one of the traditional justifications for
punishment ... ").
116. Id. at 708; cf Frase, supra note 18, at 591-92 (describing similar concept of limiting
retributivism that would place "outer limits both on who may be punished
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as a side constraint could serve as a structure that prevents trading off
important proportionality rights without special justification.117 Similarly,
my proposal to implement a process for developing a felt sense of justice
does not require that retributivism be the only legitimate justification for
punishment, but that it must be one of the justifications and thus exert a
limiting proportionality effect.
In contrast, Richard Frase develops two theories of nonretributive
proportionality predicated on utilitarian principles. One measures
proportionality relative to the ends being pursued-whether "the measure's
costs and burdens ... outweigh the likely benefits." ' 8 The other measures
proportionality relative "to other, less costly or burdensome means of
achieving the same goals."' 19 With respect to the threshold step of the
modified Solem test, Frase proposes application of a three-part analysis,
examining (1) retributive proportionality, (2) ends proportionality, and (3)
means proportionality. 121 My proposal is most similar to his in terms of
seeking to work within the first Solem factor. It seems unlikely, though, that
... and how hard they may be punished"). But ef Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness, supra
note 99, at 1442 (disputing vague or flexible view of "desert [that] requires no particular
sentence ... merely set[ting] the outer limits of a range of just punishments").
117. Lee, supra note 20, at 706-07. Lee explicitly places implementation of retributivism as
a side constraint to the side, see id. at 714, but suggests that comparative desert is an essential
element for judicial enforcement because it provides for scheme-wide and system-wide
analyses: Comparative desert "asks whether the sentencing scheme sufficiently distinguishes
among offenders of different levels of seriousness," and "whether the punishment in question
stands in appropriate relation to punishment for crimes that are as serious as, or more serious
than, the crime at issue." Id. at 716. Requiring an analysis of comparative desert would likely
require implementation of the second and third Solem factors.
118. Frase, supra note 18, at 592. Ends proportionality seeks to compare the burdens
imposed on the offender with the likely societal benefits. It looks at past harm only in
connection with preventing future crime, and may "aggregate [the] harm caused by [similar
acts] and the difficulty of detecting and deterring [them]." Id. at 594-95 (citing Malcolm E.
Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment,
24 STAN. L. REV. 838, 851-52 (1972)). Unlike retributivism, ends proportionality also considers
societal crime control benefits and potential undesirable collateral consequences like a loss of
public confidence in our criminal justice system. See id. at 595.
119. Id. at 592. According to "basic utilitarian efficiency values: among equally effective
means to achieve a given end, those that are less costly or burdensome should be preferred." Id.
at 595 (citing NORVAL MORRIS, THE FuTuRE OF IMPRISONMENT 59-60, 75, 79 (1974)
(explaining the principle of parsimony)).
120. See id. at 633-34. He further suggests that gross disproportionality under any one of
the three measures would trigger intra- and interjurisdictional review, and that either of these
reviews could corroborate the initial inference of gross disproportionality and result in the
finding of an Eighth Amendment violation. See id.
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courts would adopt his sophisticated, layered analysis on even a limited
selection of criminal sentences.
1 21
III. MODIFIED PRINCIPLES AND PROPORTIONALITY TOOLS
I propose using transparency, limited deference, and a felt sense of
justice to supplement the Court's objective factors principle and to modify
current interpretations of legislative primacy and penological pluralism.
Applying my proposed principles to the comparison of offense gravity and
sentence severity, and to the threshold assessment of gross
disproportionality, would support the development of an explicit,
predictable proportionality process. In practice, courts have adopted such a
high standard for gross disproportionality and such a low standard for their
own responsibility to make meaningful proportionality judgments that
virtually no case requires intra- and interjurisdictional review. This practice
may have developed out of uncertainty as to how to conduct a principled
proportionality review, or perhaps out of skepticism that such review could
be anything but subjective and thus illegitimate. Regardless, my proposal
seeks to substitute a more structured and rigorous application of the
threshold test for conclusory assumptions of gross disproportionality.
A. Transparency and Objectivity
Adoption of a transparency principle is predicated on the existence of a
decisionmaking process that can be articulated and explained, i.e., that is
transparent. Reliance on objective factors in making proportionality
threshold decisions would be enhanced if courts cited the factors weighed,
and explained the multiple judgments entailed in applying the threshold
test. 22 The critique that proportionality assessments are inevitably
subjective stems in part from a failure to consistently follow an established
analytical process. One alternative possibility would be for courts to
conduct intra- and interjurisdictional comparisons in every instance to
insure that proportionality assessments are not grossly inconsistent with
121. As noted earlier, Frase proposed creating three categories of sentences: "(i)
noncustodial and short to medium-length custody terms; (2) lengthy custodial terms; and (3)
death sentences," and applying his three proportionality principles to the second and third
categories only. Id. at 631-32.
122. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000 (1991) (exhortation to apply
"'objective factors to the maximum possible extent"' (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,
274-75 (1980))).
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state and national sentencing patterns. 23 Absent an explicit readoption of
the original Solem test, however, courts must first determine whether a
given sentence meets a threshold gross disproportionality standard.
Currently, comparative analysis occurs only if this threshold is met.
In contrast, a transparency principle could work within the current
decisional landscape. Transparency demands that courts justify the decision
that a particular sentence is not grossly disproportionate in relation to a
particular offense, as opposed to concluding without explanation that the
threshold has not been met.124 To the extent that normative judgments
cannot be avoided, requiring a court to detail why it has reached a particular
conclusion given a particular factual circumstance can contribute to the
development of decisional norms and predictability. Moreover, decisional
line drawing is not unique to threshold proportionality assessments. In
Solem, the Court referenced the line drawing entailed in adjudicating claims
based on the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. 25 Other examples
where "[t]he absence of a black-letter rule" requires judges to draw lines
include determining the materiality of undisclosed evidence, whether a
confession was coerced, and whether criminal defense counsel was
ineffective. 26
Two potential objections to applying a transparency principle are that it
cannot be done and that it should not be done. An examination of the
Supreme Court's approach to assessing the proportionality of civil punitive
damages awards undercuts the argument that a transparent process for
applying the first Solem factor is not possible. Notwithstanding the
differences between a legislatively established sentencing scheme and a jury
verdict on punitive damages, the fact that courts can and have developed
rules for making what might otherwise be considered a hopelessly
subjective judgment demonstrates that such rule development is possible.127
123. See Chemerinsky, supra note 90, at 1076-79; cf Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1020 (White,
J., dissenting) (arguing that abandonment of the second and third factors set forth in Solem
makes any attempt at an "objective proportionality analysis futile").
124. Cf Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 42 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing
potential that threshold test might become a de facto determinative test if courts "blocked every
ultimately invalid constitutional claim").
125. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 295 (1983) (explaining that the amount of
permissible delay must be determined on a case-by-case basis under a functional, contextualized
analysis (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972))); see also Ewing, 538 U.S. at 33-
34 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to punitive damages awards under the Due Process
Clause).
126. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 33, 34 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127. The proportionality factors in punitive damages cases are the reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct, the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, and the comparability of
the punitive damages awards with possible civil or criminal sanctions for similar misconduct.
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The process of making decisions in individual cases, and then explaining
those decisions would provide valuable information from which to
rationalize and develop rules for proportionality analysis in noncapital
criminal sentencing.
Additionally, some courts have already engaged in transparent
decisionmaking when faced with challenges to a criminal sentence s
proportionality. Two examples are court decisions in the federal appellate
courts, and in the California Supreme Court prior to Rummel. In a 1973
decision, the Fourth Circuit held that a mandatory life sentence for a
defendant who wrote a $50 check on insufficient funds in 1949, transported
$140 in forged checks across state lines in 1955, and then committed
perjury at his son's murder trial in 1968 violated the Eighth Amendment.'28
The court articulated a four-part analytical process and applied this process
to the facts in the case.'29 In the six to seven years following this decision,
the Fourth Circuit upheld six state sentences against Eighth Amendment
challenges, and only twice held that noncapital sentences were
unconstitutionally disproportionate. 3 ' Similarly, during the period before
and just after Rummel, the California Supreme Court ruled only a half a
dozen times that specific sentences, such as an indeterminate life sentence
for a second offense of indecent exposure, were unconstitutional. 3 '
With respect to stewardship of judicial resources, transparency in
analyzing the first Solem factor would not require a full-blown intra- and
See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575-85 (1996); see also Gershowitz, supra
note 90, at 1258.
128. Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 138 (4th Cir. 1973).
129. See id. at 139-43. The court noted that if the first check had been for a penny less,
$49.99, then the recidivism increase would have been an extra five years for a second serious
offense added to a base of one to ten years for the perjury offense. See id. at 139-41. It then
posited a framework that considered: (1) the nature of the offense and whether it was a crime of
violence that posed danger to another; (2) the legislative purpose behind the punishment; (3) an
interjurisdictional review of other states' sentences in similar circumstances; and (4) an
intrajurisdictional review within the state of sentences for other crimes. See id. at 140-42; see
also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1015-16 & n.2 (1991) (White, J., dissenting)
(collecting four state court decisions finding sentences unconstitutionally disproportionate and
asserting that the "mere handful of sentences . . . [proved] reviewing courts have not baldly
substituted their own subjective moral values for those of the legislature").
130. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 304-05 & n.23 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(collecting cases). "[T]he body of Eighth Amendment law that has developed in that Circuit
constitutes impressive empirical evidence that the federal courts are capable of applying the
Eighth Amendment to disproportionate noncapital sentences with a high degree of sensitivity to
principles of federalism and state autonomy." Id. at 306.
131. See, e.g., In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921, 935, 940 (1972). See generally Vitiello, supra
note 17, at 1058-71 (analyzing California Supreme Court proportionality jurisprudence). Cf
Dubber, supra note 104, at 521 (critiquing insufficient attention given to state supreme court
decisions on constitutional criminal law issues).
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interjurisdictional review in every case. Moreover, not every transparent
decisionmaking process would require a long exposition. Sentencing
challenges alleging gross disproportionality will likely fall into three
categories: easy cases, hard cases, and cases in the middle. Easy cases
would require only some explanation about why the judge viewed the
offense and sentence as well-matched. Transparency in these cases would
likely yield few differences in outcomes-with the important caveat that a
court must articulate why it views particular cases as easy. Hard cases
would, in any event, require examination of the second and third Solem
factors, and the work done analyzing the first Solem factor would be of use
in determining which offenses are more and less serious for purposes of
intrajurisdictional review. Cases in the middle which currently are being
summarily dismissed would require more detailed analysis and thus expend
more judicial resources. Requiring transparency would promote a more
rigorous analysis so that courts could more accurately distinguish between
easy and mid-level cases. The additional cost is warranted as a matter of
principle in terms of upholding Eighth Amendment standards. Additionally,
as courts gain experience making threshold proportionality decisions in a
transparent manner, they will gain efficiency, and costs will decrease.
B. Limited Deference
Like transparency, limited deference addresses a judicial failure to apply
the first Solem factor in a meaningful way. Whereas transparency demands
explicit, written decisionmaking, limited deference is designed to counteract
wholesale deference to the legislature and the abdication of responsibility
by courts. From the Second Circuit, in which judicial review appears to be
limited to determining whether the sentence falls within the administrative
or legislative range,132 to the Fourth Circuit, in which courts decline even to
engage in proportionality review for sentences less than life without
parole,133 the record of federal appellate court proportionality review in
132. See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 163 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Lengthy prison
sentences, even those that exceed any conceivable life expectancy of a convicted defendant, do
not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment when
based on a proper application of the Sentencing Guidelines or statutorily mandated consecutive
terms."); United States v. Hildenbrandt, 207 F. App'x. 50, 52 (2d Cir. 2006) (same); United
States v. Maflahi, 183 F. App'x. 13, 15 (2d Cir. 2005) (same). Only two Second Circuit cases
even cite Ewing. See United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 152 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v.
Carter, 110 F. App'x. 165, 166 (2d Cir. 2004).
133. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 204 F. App'x. 161, 163 n.2 (4th Cir. 2006)
("'[P]roportionality review is not available for any sentence less than life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole."' (quoting United States v. Ming Hong, 242 F.3d 528, 532 (4th Cir.
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noncapital criminal cases is mixed. 34 Of the thirteen state supreme courts
citing Ewing, two found sentences unconstitutionally disproportionate,
35
three did not substantively address proportionality,'3 6 and of the eight
remaining states, two misstated the law on at least one occasion.'37 If
complete deference were the appropriate standard, then the reviewing
court's role would be to intervene only when a sentence fell outside the
governing legislative scheme.' 38 According to Rummel and its progeny,
however, wholesale deference is not the articulated standard.
39
There are several plausible reasons for the dearth of substantively
reasoned decisions and the apparent lack of judicial enthusiasm for these
cases. By establishing a gross disproportionality standard, limiting intra-
2001))); United States v. Miller, 185 F. App'x. 275, 275-76 (4th Cir. 2006) (same); United
States v. Bledsoe, 177 F. App'x. 311, 312 (4th Cir. 2006) (same); United States v. Bourque, 157
F. App'x. 646, 650 (4th Cir. 2005) (same).
134. For example, a review of ninety-seven cases in the Ninth Circuit that cited to Ewing
revealed that Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 755, 767 (9th Cir. 2004), was the only one that
conducted a full proportionality analysis. In contrast, only two cases in the Fifth Circuit cited to
Ewing. Both, however, failed to engage in any substantive proportionality analysis. See United
States v. Strahan, 134 F. App'x. 709, 710 (5th Cir. 2005) (asserting that in-depth analysis is not
required, and relying on Harmelin and Hutto as benchmarks for gross disproportionality);
Austin v. Johnson, 328 F.3d 204, 209-10 (5th Cir. 2003) ("Cases that have found
disproportionate sentences involve long-term imprisonment, so the nominal punishment of a
one-day boot camp [for stealing a candy bar] cannot pass muster.").
135. See State v. Davis, 79 P.3d 64, 66-75 (Ariz. 2003) (involving a fifty-two-year
sentence based on mandatory minimums for a twenty-year-old man who had voluntary sex with
two teenage girls); Crosby v. State, 824 A.2d 894, 896-97 (Del. 2003) (per curiam) (involving a
forty-five-year sentence under a habitual offender statute based on a guilty plea to forgery and
criminal impersonation).
136. See Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 113 P.3d 82, 92 (Cal. 2005) (punitive damages
review); Robert L. v. Superior Court, 69 P.3d 951, 956 (Cal. 2003) (definition of wobbler
offense); State ex rel. Charvat v. Frye, 114 Ohio St. 3d 76, 2007-Ohio-2882, 868 N.E.2d 270, at
27 (limiting trial judges' power to impose conditions that do not exist in the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act); Commonwealth v. Shiffier, 879 A.2d 185, 199 n.2 (Pa. 2005)
(Newman, J., dissenting) (referring to the absence of an Eighth Amendment claim).
137. See State v. Snow, 144 P.3d 729, 746 (Kan. 2006) ("Generally, an appellate court will
not interfere with a sentence that is within the statutory limits unless there are special
circumstances indicating that the sentencing court abused its discretion."); State v. Buchhold,
2007 SD 15, 36, 727 N.W.2d 816, 825 ("The first step in establishing whether a threshold
showing of gross disproportionality in sentencing exists is to determine whether the legislature
had a rational basis to conclude the statutory sentencing guidelines would further the objectives
of the State's criminal justice system. We then decide whether a defendant's sentence is grossly
disproportionate to the crime by determining whether that sentence furthers those objectives the
legislature sought to advance." (citations omitted)).
138. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1003 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (positing a rational basis standard of review for the
legislatively mandated life without parole sentence); cf Karlan, supra note 11, at 889-93
(outlining modest, mid-level, and expansive judicial review of legislation).
139. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
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and interjurisdictional analysis with a threshold test, and articulating a
principle of legislative primacy, the Supreme Court has limited, but not
completely withdrawn from, reviewing proportionality in noncapital
criminal sentencing. Lower courts could easily interpret the Court's
pronouncements, however, as signaling a hands-off approach.14
Alternatively, courts simply may be confused by the Supreme Court's
contradictory and inconsistent treatment of proportionality challenges. A
third possibility is that lower courts are reluctant to invest resources into
making threshold comparisons of offense gravity and sentence severity
because these assessments seem subjective and value laden as opposed to
objective and neutral.
41
Whatever the reason, adopting a perspective of wholesale deference
contradicts the judiciary's duty to interpret and uphold the Constitution, and
the Supreme Court's approach in the arguably analogous area of
proportionality of civil fines and punitive damages. While recognizing the
important and frequently determinative role of legislatures in criminal
justice matters generally and with sentence length in particular, a principle
of limited deference demands that courts act as a check on potential
legislative excess.1 41 "[N]o penalty is per se constitutional,"' 4' and "the fact
that a punishment has been legislatively mandated does not automatically
render it legal or usual in the constitutional sense."' 144 Both in capital and
noncapital contexts, the Court has adjudicated the constitutionality of
legislative enactments regarding punishment. 145  It is moreover
140. See, e.g., Adaway v. State, 902 So. 2d 746, 748-50 (Fla. 2005) (carefully parsing
Supreme Court precedent and correctly identifying gross disproportionality as the threshold
inquiry, but then summarily concluding that "[a]lthough the penalty is harsh, we accept the
Legislature's judgment about the gravity of the crime").
141. Cf Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1007 (seeking to avoid perception that no clear standards are
being applied and that the rule of law is imperiled by sentences imposed for no discernible
reason other than the subjective reactions of the sentencing judge).
142. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 n.16 (1983) (retaining judicial authority to
review legislature's determination of types and limits of punishments for crimes, and trial
court's exercise of discretion "in sentencing convicted criminals"); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S.
370, 377 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring) ("[L]imits of a prison sentence normally are a matter of
legislative prerogative, and trial courts have the primary responsibility to determine an
appropriate sentence .... "); see also United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53
n.4 (1938) ("There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such
as those of the first ten Amendments .... "). See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST (1980).
143. Solem, 463 U.S. at 290.
144. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1016-17 (White, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
145. See id. at 1017. The Court expressly struck down legislatively authorized capital
punishment for rape in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), and for accomplice felony
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"emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is," and to determine whether a legislative enactment is consistent
with the Constitution.
46
Judicial abdication of responsibility under the guise of deference to the
legislature is revealed by a hypothetical state sentencing scheme that
penalizes offenders more or less harshly based on race, gender, or non-
resident status. Article III courts obviously would have a constitutional duty
to intervene under such a scenario. A sentencing scheme that violates the
Eighth Amendment's proportionality requirement similarly warrants court
intervention. Line drawing related to offense gravity and sentence severity
is appropriately vested in the legislature in the first instance.47 However,
judicial review for Eighth Amendment proportionality should be more than
a rubber stamp based on an invocation of deference to the legislature.
In addition to having a duty to review the proportionality of criminal
sentences, courts are capable of making carefully considered sentencing
decisions based on their experience imposing sentences and reviewing
them. Congress itself recognized the judiciary's institutional competence to
address questions of sentencing when it "placed the [U.S. Sentencing]
Commission in the Judicial Branch precisely because of the Judiciary's
special knowledge and expertise: [S]entencing is a field in which the
Judicial Branch long has exercised substantive or political judgment."'48
Reviewing noncapital sentences for gross disproportionality is a natural and
necessary corollary to courts' already existing sentencing work. Courts have
well-developed processes for garnering the sentencing information they
need from prosecutors, defense attorneys, and probation departments. They
have experience interpreting legislatively determined sentencing ranges,
mandatory minimums, and recidivist sentencing schemes. They have
murder in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). But cf State v. Kennedy, 2005-1981, p. 30-
45 (La. 5/22/07); 957 So. 2d 757, 779-89 (considering whether capital punishment for rape of a
child violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment), cert.
granted sub nom. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 76 U.S.L.W. 3339 (U.S. Jan. 4, 2008) (No. 07-343).
The Court similarly struck down a legislatively authorized sentence of incarceration in Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). See also Hutto, 454 U.S. at 374 n.3 (recognizing that legislatively
mandated sentences may violate Eighth Amendment); Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274 n. 1I (same).
146. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also Rummel, 445
U.S. at 303 (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating that it is the role of courts, under Article III of the
Constitution, to judge whether "'a particular legislative enactment . . . runs afoul of some
limitation placed by the Constitution on the authority of that body."' (quoting Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 466 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting))).
147. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 275-76.
148. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 396 (1989); see also United States v.
Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1263 (D. Utah 2004) ("This court deals with sentencing matters
on a daily basis and feels in a unique position to advise Congress on such matters.").
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similar experience with calculating an offender's term of incarceration
under federal and state sentencing guidelines. A principle of limited
deference would encourage courts to take a more deliberative and assertive
approach to upholding constitutional proportionality.
The system of checks and balances between the judicial, legislative, and
executive branches of government requires communication. 149 As courts
impose criminal sentences and adjudicate direct appeals from and habeas
challenges to these sentences, they could explicitly hone their collective
proportionality judgment. Focusing more attention on the first threshold
factor would enable courts to more fully develop a jurisprudence of offense
gravity, sentence severity, and the relationship between the two. Over time,
the experience of making explicit proportionality judgments would expose
which facts tend to be material and which inconsequential. This knowledge
could be shared with the legislative and executive branches through
published opinions.
While not every threshold decision would require extended analysis and
discussion, those that did could provide important information to
legislatures as they continue to develop generally applicable rules. While
legislatures have the capacity to conduct fact-gathering hearings and are
generally entrusted with making broad policy decisions, courts have
expertise in applying the law and in determining the fairness and
constitutionality of its application in individual cases. 5 ' The legitimacy of
our criminal justice system depends in part on public confidence in the
fairness of sentences imposed. Courts should share with legislatures the
information they have about individual cases and their approach to
149. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1262 ("'[T]he tradition of courts engaging in dialogue
with legislatures is too well-established in this and other courts to disregard."' (quoting United
States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring))).
150. Justice Breyer's Ewing dissent is an example of the kind of review that courts are well
positioned to conduct. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 35-51 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Breyer analyzed California's "serious or violent" predicate requirement and statutory wobbler
provisions and concluded with three other Justices that there was an inference of gross
disproportionality. Id. at 49. He noted several anomalies. First, wobblers cover a broad range of
offenses from "assault with a deadly weapon . . . to [s]tealing more than $100 worth of
chickens, nuts, or avocados." Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 245, 594(b)(2)(A), 487(b)(1)(A)
(West Supp. 2003)). "Some of this behavior is obviously less serious, even if engaged in twice,
than other criminal conduct that California statutes classify as pure misdemeanors, such as
reckless driving ... " Id. (citing CAL. VEH. CODE § 23103 (West Supp. 2003)). Additionally, an
offender is more likely to receive recidivist treatment, and consequently longer sentences, based
on the similarity of past crimes to the triggering crime, rather than the seriousness of the past
crimes. See id. at 50. For example, a person "who has committed two violent offenses and then
steals $200 will not fall within the ambit of the three strikes statute," but if that same person had
committed one violent offense and one petty theft, and then stole $200, she would be subject to
recidivist treatment. Id.
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analyzing proportionality in sentencing. This information and perspective is
an important and missing part of the public discourse.
Finally, courts' demonstrated ability to determine when punitive
damages awards are grossly excessive evidences their ability to assess
proportionality in criminal sentencing. While some have criticized the
Supreme Court for being overly aggressive in reviewing civil punitive
damage awards,'15 there is a long standing practice of carefully scrutinizing
the proportionality of these awards.'52 This protection stems from the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which the Court has held
affords substantive protection against grossly excessive punitive damages
awards. 53 Judicial review of punitive damages is de novo and essentially
constitutes a proportionality assessment in a civil context.'54 Like the
modified Solem test, there are three guideposts for analyzing constitutional
challenges to punitive damages awards: (1) reprehensibility of the
misconduct (offense gravity); (2) ratio of punitive damages to compensatory
damages (sentence severity); and (3) a comparison of punitive damages to
civil or criminal penalties for similar misconduct (intra- and
interjurisdictional review). 15 The fact that a meaningful proportionality
review occurs in this civil context suggests the possibility of similarly
meaningful review in a criminal context.
The Supreme Court's differing approach to proportionality in a criminal
sentencing versus civil punitive damages context is patent. 56 The question
151. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 90, at 1074-78.
152. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (holding
that $145M in punitive damages, creating a more than 9:1 punitive-compensatory damages
ratio, was grossly excessive); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996) (holding
that $2M in punitive damages was grossly excessive in relation to $4K in compensatory
damages); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 459-62 (1993) (holding that
$10M in punitive damages was not grossly excessive in relation to $19K in actual damages); see
also Gershowitz, supra note 90, at 1266-68.
153. BMW ofN. Am., 517 U.S. at 575; cf United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 337-
38 (1998) (holding that criminal forfeiture of over $350K for failure to report $1 OK violated the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 260 (1989) (holding that Excessive Fines Clause does not protect
against excessive civil punitive damages).
154. See generally Rachel A. Van Cleave, "Death is Different," Is Money Different?
Criminal Punishments, Forfeitures, and Punitive Damages-Shifting Constitutional Paradigms
for Assessing Proportionality, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 217 (2003).
155. See BMW of N. Am., 517 U.S. at 574-85; cf Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc., 492
U.S. at 300-01 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (suggesting adoption of Solem
test to excessive punitive damages analysis). But cf State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 538 U.S. at
408 (discounting comparative analysis with other criminal and civil penalties).
156. See Van Cleave, supra note 154, at 223 (discussing Supreme Court's interpretation of
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause in three different areas of jurisprudence); Lee, supra note
20, at 692 n.102 ("[There is] tension between the Court's general reluctance in the Eighth
40:0527]
562 ARIZONA STATE LAWJOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J.
is whether it is justified. The familiarity of quantifying compensatory
damages may cause proportionality review to seem easier in civil punitive
damages cases than in cases challenging criminal sentences. Additionally
reviewing jury awards by relatively few, and far more localized,
decisionmakers may seem more appealing than reviewing legislative
enactments.157 However, familiarity and ease do not justify anemic
proportionality review in the criminal context. As Chemerinsky points out,
there is no pressing social need to defer to legislative recidivist sentencing
schemes on the one hand, but not to a legislature's refusal to limit punitive
damages on the other. 58 Having determined that the Eighth Amendment
contains a guarantee against grossly disproportionate sentences of
incarceration, courts have a duty to uphold this protection.
C. Felt Sense of Justice
Unlike transparency and limited deference, a felt sense of justice
addresses normative rather than process standards. Justice Powell's original
stance in Rummel calling for a mandatory retributivist justification for all
punishment seems beyond judicial reach in light of the Court's recent,
explicit embrace of penological pluralism. 5 9 The development of a
retributivist touchstone to ensure that sentences of imprisonment are not
grossly disproportionate does not, however, require a rejection of
penological pluralism. A felt sense of justice could serve as an explanatory
device for the legitimate exercise of judicial checks and balances on the
legislative and executive branches under the Eighth Amendment. It would
not require legislatures to jettison deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation as justifications for punishment, or to redesign sentencing
schemes in accordance with retributivist principles.
Amendment proportionality cases and its relatively enthusiastic embrace of proportionality
regulation of punitive damages under the Due Process Clause."); cf Timothy Zick,
Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi-Neutral Principles and Constitutional Truths, 82 N.C. L.
REv. 115, 177 (2003) ("[The] Court has been particularly vigilant when it comes to the
supposed limits the due process guarantee places on civil monetary penalties.").
157. See Chemerinsky, supra note 90, at 1069-70 (citing distrust of "runaway juries
awarding grossly excessive punitive damages"); Karlan, supra note 11, at 903-14, 920.
158. See Chemerinsky, supra note 90, at 1065-66; see also Gershowitz, supra note 90, at
1275 (noting that the federalism concerns articulated as the rationale for minimal
proportionality review of criminal sentences is completely ignored in punitive damages review).
159. Compare Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 288 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(asserting that punishment must be based on what offender deserves), with Ewing v. California,
538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003) (asserting that legislature could adhere to any number of punishment
rationales).
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Although any proposal for normative standards poses difficult questions
about institutional competence and legitimacy, these standards are already
embedded in our thinking about proportionality, and glimpses of them are
visible in Supreme Court precedent. The parking hypothetical in Powell's
Rummel dissent continues to resonate and provides a window for exploring
the retributivist tie that is already a necessary component of constitutional
punishment. 6 ° The existence of an orthodox view of the parking
hypothetical is evidence of an implicit normative standard. Acknowledging
the role of a felt sense of justice in proportionality assessments would aid in
the development of a meaningful, as opposed to pro forma, approach to
Eighth Amendment review. Discomfort with this principle can inhibit
rigorous application of the first Solem factor and an overreliance on
legislative primacy.
Powell's enduring hypothetical is as follows: "A statute that levied a
mandatory life sentence for overtime parking might well deter vehicular
lawlessness, but it would offend our felt sense of justice." 6' One may
readily agree that this severe a sentence for this minor an offense would be
unconstitutional, but why? Imagine a legislature that articulated deterrence
of unlawful behavior as the primary goal underlying its penal code, and a
broken windows policy of harshly punishing small crimes in an effort to
deter larger ones.'6 2 Assume that a first-time offender sentenced to life
imprisonment in this jurisdiction would be parole eligible in ten years.'63 If
the deterrence value of this tough a penalty were shown to be extremely
high, then what exactly is not proportional? Why not defer to this legislative
judgment?
One response to these questions is contained within the hypothetical.
Although our felt sense of justice is obviously not susceptible to precise
160. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 288-89 (Powell, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 288; see also Ewing, 538 U.S. at 34 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to a life
sentence for overtime parking); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 81 n.2 (2003) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (referring to parking violators); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 986 n.1l
(1991) (referring to life imprisonment for overtime parking); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1018
(White, J., dissenting) (same); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 227, 311 n.3 (1983) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (same); Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274 n.1 1 ("This is not to say that a proportionality
principle would not come into play ... if a legislature made overtime parking a felony
punishable by life imprisonment."); cf Lee, supra note 20, at 711 (modifying hypothetical to
one year in prison for a parking violation).
162. See Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New
York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 272-77 & n.3 (2006).
163. In Rummel v. Estelle, both the District Court and the en banc Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit rejected an Eighth Amendment challenge to a life sentence in part because with
good time credits, Rummel would be parole eligible after serving twelve years. See 445 U.S. at
267; see also Rummel v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1193, 1201-02 (5th Cir. 1978), vacated, 587 F.2d
651, 653, 659 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
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definition, court decisions demonstrate that it can be discerned on a case-
by-case, fact-specific basis. 64 There are some normative absolutes,
"extreme examples that no rational person, in no time or place, could
accept."' 65 Herbert Packer has asserted that boiling people in oil is not
irrational if the goal is deterrence, 66 and yet the notion of imposing such a
punishment, even to deter the most heinous of crimes, is ludicrous.
Although there are obvious differences between modes of punishment and
proportionality of punishment,'67 both are subject to the Eighth Amendment
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 168 At least two Justices
have recognized the connection between a retributivist, felt sense of justice
and Eighth Amendment proportionality,'69  and there is value in
164. Cf Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I shall not
today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that
shorthand description [hard-core pornography]; and perhaps I could never succeed in
intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is
not that.").
165. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 985.
166. Packer, supra note 4, at 1076; cf United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227,
1255 (D. Utah 2004) ("[Although] mandatory life sentences for jaywalking or petty theft would,
no doubt, deter those offenses ... it would be hard to view such hypothetical statutes as resting
on rational premises.").
167. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 976-78 (asserting that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
certain modes of punishment, like burning at the stake, as opposed to requiring proportionality);
cf Dubber, supra note 104, at 559 ("[C]ruel and unusual punishments clause 'was designed to
outlaw particular modes of punishment... the rack or the stake, or any of those horrid modes of
torture, devised by human ingenuity for the gratification of fiendish passion."' (quoting JAMES
BAYARD, A BRIEF ExPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 154 (Philadelphia,
Hogan & Thompson 1840))).
168. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 33 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that
logic and constitutional structure, prohibiting excessive fines, bail, and capital punishment,
indicate the existence of a proportionality principle for imprisonment); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at
1014 (White, J., dissenting) (asserting that recognizing a proportionality principle only in capital
cases fails to explain why the words cruel and unusual include a proportionality requirement in
some cases but not in others); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 227, 289 (1983) ("It would be
anomalous indeed if the lesser punishment of a fine and the greater punishment of death were
both subject to proportionality analysis, but the intermediate punishment of imprisonment were
not."); see also Granucci, supra note 4, at 860 (asserting that prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment included a reiteration of the English policy against disproportionate
penalties).
169. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 288 (Powell, J., dissenting); Ewing, 538 U.S. at
31 (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that proportionality is inherently a concept tied to the
penological goal of retribution); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 989 ("[I]t becomes difficult even to
speak intelligently of 'proportionality,' once deterrence and rehabilitation are given significant
weight."); cf Ewing, 538 U.S. at 35 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that broad, multifaceted
proportionality principle precludes reliance on a single sentencing rationale, like deterrence, to
justify a particular punishment); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1014-15 (White, J., dissenting)
(recognizing limitations of a purely historical analysis and advocating a flexible and dynamic
approach based on evolving standards of decency).
RESUSCITATING PROPORTIONALITY
acknowledging this connection, working to define its contours, and seeking
to make the outcomes of a felt sense ofjustice analysis more predictable.
Judgments regarding proportionality are undeniably difficult to make. A
normative decision that a particular type of punishment is unconstitutional
requires an assessment of one factor, the punishment itself. In contrast,
normative decisions about proportionality require an assessment of three
factors, the offense, the sentence, and the relationship between the two.
Additionally, although a determination that a particular mode of punishment
is unconstitutional can be generalized and applied in subsequent cases, a
determination that a particular term of imprisonment is unconstitutional
must be revisited each time to examine the specific offense committed and
interaction between offense and sentence. The fact that lines may be more
easily drawn around unconstitutional modes of punishment than
unconstitutionally disproportionate punishment does not, however, excuse
courts from applying Eighth Amendment standards to terms of
imprisonment.
Justice Scalia has maintained that decisions regarding the
constitutionality of modes of punishment are cabined by "relatively clear
historical guidelines and accepted practices," while proportionality
assessments are highly contextual and subjective.17 In the former context,
he seems to recognize something like a felt sense of justice that was
informed by our shared values and history. Although public opinion
regarding various modes of punishment, as opposed to sentencing
proportionality, may be more homogenous, and the historical record more
clear, this seems like more of a difference in degree than in kind.'' Judicial
application of the offense gravity and sentence severity factors I propose
would assist in the accretion of history regarding proportionality judgments.
Even if one accepted the inevitability of clearer historical standards for
types as opposed to amounts of punishment, a felt sense of justice would,
and inherently must in any event, be contextualized. It is true that
punishments may seem disproportionate "because they were made for other
times or other places, with different social attitudes, different criminal
epidemics, different public fears, and different prevailing theories of
170. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 985.
171. The potential malleability of judgments regarding modes of punishment is exhibited
by the following example. In 1977, the Supreme Court held that imposing the death penalty for
aggravated rape of a sixteen-year old violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). Thirty years later, in
2008, the Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of a capital sentence
imposed for the rape of an eight-year old. See State v. Kennedy, 2005-1981 (La. 5/22/07); 957
So. 2d 757, cert. granted sub nom. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 76 U.S.L.W. 3339 (U.S. Jan. 4, 2008)
(No. 07-343).
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penology." ''7 The role of the courts is to reflect these variables by applying,
among other principles, a felt sense of justice in making Eighth Amendment
proportionality assessments." 3
Two examples that demonstrate the possibility of developing greater
clarity regarding the components of a felt sense of justice can be found in
the work that Robert Nozick and Joel Feinberg have done to define just
punishment in accordance with retributivist principles. A survey of the
philosophical literature in this area is beyond the scope of this article, and I
offer these schemas as examples of what could be done, as opposed to
exemplars of what should be done. As courts make transparent, explicit
proportionality decisions, patterns will emerge and formulas like these can
assist in explaining how and why a particular sentence is, or is not, grossly
disproportionate to a particular crime. Nozick's formulation is as follows:
Punishment deserved = responsibility x Harm (Pd = r x H). 174 The r ranges
from no responsibility (0), such as where a criminal defendant is not guilty
by reason of insanity, to full responsibility (1), where the defendant
intentionally committed the crime.175 The H is defined as the magnitude of
the wrongness or harm.'76 Feinberg's formulation mediates between the
172. Id.; see also id. at 987 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch 272, § 34 (1988)) (comparing
states where sodomy is punishable by not more than twenty years with those in which it is not
punishable at all). One could imagine, for example, that in a time and place where society
uniformly viewed incarceration solely as a means to rehabilitation, life sentences might be
deemed grossly disproportionate to all but the most serious of crimes.
173. Cf id. at 987 ("[Although] some offenses, involving violent harm to human beings,
will always and everywhere be regarded as serious . . . there is enormous variation-even
within a given age, not to mention across the many generations ruled by the Bill of Rights.");
Frase, supra note 18, at 591 (defining limiting retributivism as an approach that "allows all
traditional punishment purposes to play a role but places retributive outer limits both on who
may be punished (only those who are blameworthy), and how hard they may be punished
(within a range of penalties which would be widely viewed as neither unfairly severe or unduly
lenient)"); Lee, supra note 20, at 681-87 (proposing retributivism as a side constraint as a
conceptually clearer, and more robust limiting principle than the Supreme Court's disjunctive
theory which provides "that a sentence is not unconstitutionally excessive as long as it can be
justified under any one of the traditional justifications for punishment").
174. ROBERT NozICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 363-97 (1981), cited in Lee, supra
note 20, at 703 n.123.
175. Id.; see also Frase, supra note 18, at 590 (describing culpability as encompassing
"degree of intent (mens rea), motives, role in the offense, and mental illness or other diminished
capacity"); Lee, supra note 20, at 703 ("[T]his formulation ... concisely expresses the widely
held view that crimes causing the same harm should be treated differently depending on the
criminal's level of culpability.").
176. NOzICK, supra note 174, at 363-97. A complicating factor in Nozick's formula results
from the distinctions that could be drawn between wrongness and harm. The amount of harm
caused could be viewed as a function of the durability of the victim or value of the property.
Consider, for example, if on one day, an offender attempted to mug a young woman who
managed to fend off the attack, and then the next day, successfully mugged an old woman who
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deserving person (S) and the punishment deserved (X) with the desert basis
(F), or (S - F - X). In Feinberg's words, "S deserves X in virtue of F."'
177
The F in this formulation is related to a felt sense of justice in terms of
describing the retributivist tie between the offender and the sentence. While
on their face these formulas call for an exact value for the sentence
deserved, a felt sense of justice could act more as a limiting factor,
prohibiting punishments that failed to meet a retributivist nexus
requirement.
D. Proportionality Tools
The principles of transparency, limited deference, and a felt sense of
justice provide the theoretical context in which to apply the following
proportionality tools and process. These tools are designed to sharpen the
initial exercise of judgment required under the first Solem factor, and to
make this threshold decision more reliant on identified objective factors,
more predictable, and less ad hoc. Focusing first on offense gravity, I draw
on the work of Andrew von Hirsch to develop harm and culpability as two
components that courts could use in evaluating offense gravity. I also set
forth violence and magnitude as additional relevant considerations. Turning
to sentence severity, I suggest analyzing an offender's real sentence, in
terms of likely years of imprisonment, as opposed to the formal sentence
imposed. Additionally, to measure the actual impact of a prison sentence,
courts must consider objective measures of the offender's life prospects at
the time of his or her release. An offender's age and likely health following
a term of imprisonment is relevant to an evaluation of how severe an impact
a given sentence will have. Although this may be viewed as unfairly
disadvantaging younger, healthier offenders, and there may be exceptions, a
determinate sentence generally impacts more severely on an older offender
who may die in prison than on a younger offender who may have a variety
of life opportunities when released. Equipped with these analytical tools for
assessing offense gravity and sentence severity, a court's judgment
regarding gross disproportionality can be better informed and explained.
subsequently died from injuries resulting from the mugging. The wrongfulness of what the
offender did both days could be deemed comparable: in both instances, he sought to take
another person's money. Nevertheless, the harm caused is undeniably worse in the second case
where the victim died. In my proposed offense gravity factors, notions of wrongness would be
incorporated into culpability, and both harm and magnitude would be measured separately.
177. Joel Feinberg, Justice and Personal Desert, in DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE
THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 55, 61 (1970), quoted in Lee, supra note 20, at 708.
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1. Offense Gravity
To summarize, there are four potential axes for evaluating offense
gravity: harm scaling, culpability scaling, violence scaling, and magnitude
scaling. The Solem majority identified harm and culpability as two offense
gravity factors, as well as the "absolute magnitude" of the crime.17 Harm
was defined as the "harm caused or threatened to the victim or society," and
culpability was tied to criminal intent. 7 9 Magnitude and violence have also
been discussed in Supreme Court proportionality precedent, but without the
same degree of consensus. The Solem Court noted that its precepts "simply
illustrate[] that there are generally accepted criteria for comparing the
severity of different crimes on a broad scale, despite the difficulties courts
face in attempting to draw distinctions between similar crimes."
' 80
a. Harm Scaling
Harm scaling focuses on the injury suffered by the individual and/or
corporate victim. It also seeks to account for societal harm caused by a
given offense. Looking beyond the label placed on a particular crime to the
impact caused by that crime provides an additional information point.
Legislatures have already made judgments about what constitutes a
misdemeanor versus a felony, and which felonies are more serious than
others. Courts are well positioned to make fact-specific assessments of the
harm caused in an individual case by an individual offender.
178. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 293 (1983). Specifically, the Court characterized
magnitude as a sub-factor of harm, and listed the following harm precepts: (1) the "absolute
magnitude" of the crime as evidenced by the differentiation between petty and grand theft, (2)
"a lesser included offense should not be punished more severely than the greater offense," (3)
"attempts are less serious than completed crimes," and (4) "an accessory after the fact should
not be subject to a higher penalty than the principal." Id. (citations omitted); cf Ewing v.
California, 538 U.S. 11, 40 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (concluding that Ewing scored "well
toward the bottom of the criminal conduct scale" in terms of harm, magnitude, and culpability).
179. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292-93 (noting that "[m]ost would agree that negligent conduct is
less serious than intentional conduct," and the state statutory ranking of culpability, "negligent
acts, reckless acts, knowing acts, intentional acts, and malicious acts," is well established).
180. Id. at 294. In Ewing, the Solicitor General urged the following additional offense
gravity factors: (1) "the 'frequency' of the crime's commission," (2) "the 'ease or difficulty of
detection,"' and (3) "'the degree to which the crime may be deterred by differing amounts of
punishment."' 538 U.S. 11, 40 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer reasoned that
shoplifting, like traffic offenses, were frequent, but that shoplifting was easily detectable and no
evidence had been presented indicating "that the law enforcement community believes lengthy
prison terms necessary adequately to deter shoplifting." Id. The policy and administrative
concerns that result from aggregating offenses and offenders and using a utilitarian analysis to




Andrew von Hirsch has theorized that individual harms fall into three
categories: serious, intermediate, and lesser. 8' He defines serious or welfare
harms as those that deprive persons of the ability "to choose and order their
way of living."' 182 Death obviously falls within this category.'83 It also
includes serious physical injury such as one that might prevent an athlete
from competing in professional sports, or an artist from painting; a crime
like rape which might derail a victim's ability to meaningfully pursue her
life; and serious economic injury that takes a person's livelihood.1
4
Intermediate or security interests are those that provide a cushion
"[b]eyond the bare minimum of health and economic well-being required to
make any meaningful choices . . . . Without that margin, the person may
barely be able to function but must live in acute anxiety and discomfort."'' 85
An intermediate harm causes one's quality of life to deteriorate because
there is no margin above what is minimally necessary to live.'86 Crimes like
a residential burglary that violates one's home, or a substantial assault that
violates one's personal integrity would cause intermediate harm.'87 The least
serious harm affects accumulated interests. A crime like petty theft would
cause a lesser harm, one that does not threaten one's core interests or the
cushion around these interests that provide a margin of safety.
88
Measuring the harm experienced by an individual victim may seem
inherently subjective, but using either a reasonable or egg-shell skull victim
standard explicitly and then analyzing the nature of the harm caused would
develop a data set of these judgments.'89 This, in turn, could result in better-
informed, more consistent decisionmaking about the level of harm caused.
For example, the fact that an offender has committed a residential burglary
would not be sufficient to determine the level of harm. If the home had been
left basically intact, but for the items taken, then this crime might be
deemed to cause a lesser harm. In contrast, another burglary in which
similar items had been taken, but the home had also been wantonly
vandalized and destroyed might be deemed to have caused an intermediate
181. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND
DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 67-70 (1985) (citing JOEL FEINBERG,
HARM TO OTHERS 37-45, 185-214 (1984)).
182. Id. at 67,
183. See id. at 68.
184. See id. at 67-69 (citing FEINBERG, supra note 181, at 37-45, 185-214).
185. Id. at 69.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 70.
188. See id.
189. See id. at 70 (differentiating the harm in breaking the pinky finger of a stockbroker
versus a concert pianist).
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level harm. Similarly, a robbery of the same amount of money, $500 for
example, from a hedge fund manager on the one hand, and from an elderly
retiree dependent on her social security check on the other, could be deemed
to cause varying levels of harm.19 The harm to corporate victims seems best
measured in magnitude of monetary loss, which could incorporate
reputational or good will interests.
The Harmelin and Ewing pluralities focused on threatened as well as
actual or crystalized harm, at times placing great weight on the potential
future harm that may result as a ripple effect of the crime committed. In
Harmelin, the plurality relied heavily on the notion of future harm likely to
be caused by the scourge of drug use, drug dealing, and drug-related
violence on U.S. society in upholding the constitutionality of a life sentence
without parole for a first-time offender convicted of drug possession. 9'
Similarly, the plurality in Ewing weighed the defendant's prior burglary
convictions more heavily because even though no one had actually been
hurt at the time of these crimes, there was a possibility that someone might
have been harmed and for violence to have ensued. 92 A related issue arises
when courts consider unsuccessful attempts, or the effect that luck should
have on an assessment of harm. 9 3 In the case of a residential burglary, the
burglar may seek to maximize the odds that no one will be home by
surveilling the home, learning when the occupants were likely to be out, and
planning the crime for that window of time. Yet, whether or not someone
happens to be in the home at the time of the crime is to some extent a matter
of luck. Additionally, working to minimize this risk may expose the
190. Differentiating between victims with and without resources, such as economic, social,
and medical resources, may exacerbate socioeconomic disadvantage among offenders. It may be
that poor offenders tend to commit crimes against poor victims who tend to suffer greater harm.
This skewing effect could potentially be mitigated through a culpability discount based on
socioeconomic class. Cf Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background": Should the Criminal
Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQ. 9 (1985)
(examining whether offender's life circumstances could form the basis for excusing criminal
conduct).
191. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 956, 1002-04 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (citing Paul J. Goldstein, Drugs and Violent Crime, in
PATHWAYS TO CRIMINAL VIOLENCE 16, 24-36 (Neil Alan Weiner & Marvin E. Wolfgang eds.,
1989)).
192. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 18-19, 29-30 (2003) (inadvertently awakening
one victim and forcing another victim from building mailroom to individual apartment to steal
her money and credit cards); see also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 316 (1983) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) ("It is sheer fortuity that the places respondent burglarized were unoccupied and that
he killed no pedestrians while behind the wheel."); cf United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d
1227, 1244 (D. Utah 2004) ("[I]s it rational to punish a person who might shoot someone with a
gun he carried far more harshly than the person who actually does shoot or harm someone?").
193. See generally BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK (1981).
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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offender to a longer sentence based on premeditation, as opposed to
committing a crime of opportunity.
The approach taken by the Harmelin and Ewing pluralities has the
obvious, compounded difficulty of not just evaluating what happened, but
predicting what could have happened and what is likely to happen in the
future. It requires judgments about non-actualized and future risks of harm
as well as actual harm. 194 To the extent that one is persuaded that
assessments of actual harm are often subjective, assessments of potential
past and future harm are hopelessly subjective. The simplest way in which
to address these difficulties would be to evaluate more narrowly only what
actually happened. Focusing on the here and now may lead to undeserved
windfalls and unlucky penalties, but the possibility of devising a method of
systematically addressing all possible contingencies seems low. If courts are
compelled to consider threatened harm in their accounting of harm, then
they should do so explicitly, explaining what they are predicting, what and
how much harm could have or was likely to result, and how this impacts
their final harm scaling judgment.
b. Culpability Scaling
While notions of offender responsibility are already partially accounted
for in the liability judgment, such as when an offender is convicted of
murder as opposed to manslaughter, culpability should nevertheless inform
judicial judgments of offense gravity. Culpability is traditionally linked to
levels of criminal intent.'95 In addition to consideration of mental states,
excuses, and capacity, I propose that certain offender characteristics and
criminal history should factor into culpability scaling. According to von
Hirsch, an offender's culpability level is determined by four factors: (1) his
or her mental state, such as purposeful, knowing, reckless, or negligent, (2)
the existence or lack of an excuse, such as necessity or duress, (3)
194. Cf Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1022-23 (White, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the harm
caused or threatened by the crime of possession of a large quantity of drugs "affects the criminal
who uses the drugs most directly," and that "the ripple effect on society" often results from drug
addiction as opposed to the crime of drug possession). Justice White identified tangential effects
such as "related crimes, lost productivity, health problems, and the like," but distinguished drug
possession from crimes directed against the persons and property of others, and relied on
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 660-67 (1962), in asserting that these effects were the
consequence of addiction which could not be criminalized. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1023
(White, J., dissenting).
195. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 293-94 (1983) (offering as an example of the link
between culpability and criminal intent, a defendant's motive in committing a crime, since a
contract killing is more serious than a passion killing).
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diminished capacity, and (4) the offender's motives. 196 These factors are
basic criminal law precepts with which courts adjudicating criminal
prosecutions and sentencing those convicted of crimes have ample
experience. '97
A number of other offender characteristics may be relevant to a
culpability assessment. For example, the federal sentencing guidelines note
a number of specific offender characteristics that may impact sentencing
within the guidelines range. These characteristics include age at the time of
the offense, education level, drug dependence or alcohol abuse, and
employment record. 98  While the guidelines generally discourage
consideration of these characteristics for purposes of departing from the
guideline range, courts have nonetheless considered them. For example,
both the Ninth Circuit and District of Columbia Circuit considered lack of
guidance as a youth as grounds for a downward departure prior to the
Sentencing Commission's amendment explicitly disapproving this factor.
99
These courts held that youthful lack of guidance remained a valid departure
ground for certain offenders because eliminating it would constitute an Ex
Post Facto Clause violation.00
Finally, criminal history is also relevant to culpability. Von Hirsch has
suggested that an offender should receive a desert discount for a first
offense and is more deserving of punishment for a second or third offense
following a term or terms of imprisonment.2' The Supreme Court has held
that sentencing enhancements based on criminal history do not violate
double jeopardy,20 2 and the federal sentencing guidelines create a grid with
criminal history on one axis and offense level on the other.20 3 Under the
guidelines, the worse an offender's criminal history, the more determinative
it is of the sentencing range. 0 4
196. See VON HIRSCH, supra note 181, at 71-73.
197. For example, the excuse of provocation, if established, moves a homicide from murder
to manslaughter. See id. at 72 (citing GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 242-50
(1978)).
198. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H (2007); ef Robinson, Punishing
Dangerousness, supra note 99, at 1439-41 ("[Although] one of the best predictors of future
criminality is employment history . . . [a] person does not deserve more punishment for an
offense because he has a poor employment history.").
199. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1. 12 (effective Nov. 1, 1992).
200. See United States v. Clark, 8 F.3d 839, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v. Johns, 5
F.3d 1267, 1272 (9th Cir. 1993). Obviously, an ex post facto argument is only valid for
sentences imposed prior to the November 1, 1992 effective date.
201. VON HIRSCH, supra note 181, at 77.
202. See Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 406 (1995).




Although the Supreme Court has been skeptical about the usefulness of
violence scaling, it seems uncontroversial to assert that, all other things
being equal, a crime committed through violent means is more grave than
the same crime committed through nonviolent means.0 5 In the same way
that it had rejected the precursor to the Solem three-part test, the Rummel
Court rejected the notion that characterizing a crime as violent assisted in an
objective assessment of offense gravity. Justice Rehnquist supported this
assertion with an example from literature. He reasoned that Claudius's
murder of Hamlet's father by poisoning is arguably less violent than
Brutus's murder of Caesar by stabbing, but should not be punished more
lightly.0 6
Another potential argument against the value of violence scaling is that it
unfairly privileges white-collar nonviolent crime. Rehnquist described the
following scenarios:
The highly placed executive who embezzles huge sums from a
state savings and loan association, causing many shareholders of
limited means to lose substantial parts of their savings, has
committed a crime very different from a man who takes a smaller
amount of money from the same savings and loan at the point of a
gun. Yet rational people could disagree as to which criminal
merits harsher punishment.0 7
205. Cf Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 987 (1991) ("[S]ome offenses, involving
violent harm to human beings, will always and everywhere be regarded as serious."); Eugene
Volokh, Crime Severity and Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90 VA. L. REV. 1957, 1967-71
(2004) (asserting that distinguishing between crimes of violence and property crimes in a Fourth
Amendment search and seizure context is a potentially objective distinction).
206. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 282 n.27. While using only one scaling method,
violence, may lead to a conclusion that seems wrong, multiple scaling methods must be
employed. For example, the possibility that Brutus's crime was motivated by a misguided sense
of civic duty, in contrast with Claudius's familial relationship with his victim, the premeditated
nature of Claudius's crime, and the way in which he benefitted personally could warrant a
higher culpability score and harsher penalty. Violence should be just one factor in the mix, not
the determinative factor. See id. at 299 n. 19 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("The relevant objective
factors should be considered together and, although the weight assigned to each may vary, no
single factor will ever be controlling.").
207. Id. at 282 n.27 (majority opinion). In discounting the nonviolent nature of Rummel's
crimes, the Court relied on legislative primacy stating that: "The presence or absence of
violence does not always affect the strength of society's interest in deterring a particular crime
or in punishing a particular criminal." Id. at 275. It listed high level, corporate crimes in the
areas of "antitrust, bribery, or clean air or water standards" as being nonviolent and yet serious.
Id.
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While rational people could disagree, their disagreement would not stem
from the fact that violence has ambiguous significance when evaluating
offense gravity. In this example, harm in terms of the numerous low-income
shareholders affected, culpability in terms of the violation of a position of
trust, and magnitude in terms of the dollar amount of the loss would weigh
against the highly placed executive. While the bank robber would receive a
higher violence rating, his magnitude rating would be lower. An assessment
of the robber's harm and culpability scaling would depend on facts such as
whether someone was hurt, and possibly the robber's motive for stealing the
money.
As with other areas of judicial decisionmaking, the potential for rational
disagreement about the significance of violence does not absolve courts of
the responsibility to make individual offense gravity judgments and to
explain them. In Harmelin, Justice White in a dissent joined by two other
Justices asserted that the offense at issue, possession of over 650 grams of
cocaine, was nonviolent." 8 Justice Kennedy, writing for himself and two
other Justices, called this assertion of nonviolence "false to the point of
absurdity."2"9 But, the fact that these Justices disagreed does not mean that
violence scaling should not be done. As long as courts explicitly set forth
the reasons for their conclusions, these varying judgments would create a
database of violence assessments. Analysis of this data could lead to the
development of experience-based rules for more predictable
decisionmaking in the future. Currently, as reflected in legislative
enactments, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, and in individual cases
involving drug offenses, there appears to be some consensus that drug-
related crimes rank high on a general offense gravity scale. Application of
violence and harm scaling would require courts to do more than simply
state that a drug possession crime is violent and causes great harm. Courts
would be accountable for explaining the reasoning behind their conclusions,
and these reasons would then be subject to testing.
d. Magnitude Scaling
The concept of magnitude scaling is straightforward. Having evaluated
the consequences of the offense (harm), the blameworthiness of the
offender (culpability), and the nature of the offense (violence), magnitude
seeks to measure the size of the offense. One way to examine magnitude is
208. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1022-24 (White, J., dissenting).
209. See id. at 1002 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see
also United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1247 (D. Utah 2004) (characterizing




through the monetary value of the crime committed. As with violence
scaling in Rummel, Rehnquist contended that the line drawing between
$120.75, $5,000, $50,000, and $500,000 was hopelessly subjective. 2t  While
distinguishing between a crime of $45,000 and one of $50,000 may feel
subjective, it seems indisputable that all other things being equal, a crime of
$120.75 is less serious than one of $5,000. The fact that it might be more
difficult to measure the difference between a crime of $120.75 and $500, or
to match sentences in terms of years to specific crimes does not make the
task of distinguishing between exponential differences in magnitude
inherently subjective.
Rehnquist also used the concept of attempt to argue that magnitude
scaling was not productive.2 It is true that in a failed attempt to steal
$50,000, no money is lost, but the offender would be no less blameworthy,
only less skillful, than if he had succeeded. 212 The fact that the magnitude of
the crime might not be large would be counteracted by the offender's steady
culpability level, regardless of success or failure. Attempts by definition
cause less tangible harm than completed crimes, and therefore, a thwarted
fraud in the amount of $50,000 would score low on harm and magnitude
scales. In terms of offender culpability, however, education level and trust
betrayed could yield a high culpability level, and an attempt may or may not
be violent. These various scales would yield an overall offense gravity score
that reflects the intuition that such judgments should not depend solely on
the amount of monetary damage caused.213
2. Sentence Severity
Sentence severity has been less fully theorized than offense gravity. In
one sense, ranking sentences in terms of years of imprisonment is a simple
arithmetical task. Two aspects of sentence severity that courts should
explicitly consider, however, are actual versus imposed sentence, and the
210. See 445 U.S. at 275-76.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 276.
213. While drug crimes could also be quantified in monetary terms, it may make sense to
use measurements of the amount and type of drug to determine magnitude, as is done under the
federal sentencing guidelines. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c)(4) (2006)
(requiring at least one kilogram of heroin, compared to five kilograms of cocaine to trigger a
ten-year guidelines minimum). It may be difficult to measure the size of so-called street crimes
apart from harm to the victim, but measures such as lost wages from work and the cost of
medical expenses are possible.
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offender's age and opportunities at the time of his or her likely release."1 4
Although the threshold test precedes an intrajurisdictional review, courts
could additionally consider relative sentence severity within the state.
Examining sentence severity alone, without connection to various offenses,
would be a simple task and could reveal useful information. For example,
Justice White's dissent in Harmelin noted that Michigan has no death
penalty, and that the defendant's mandatory life sentence without parole
was the most severe punishment possible." 5 This suggested analysis would
entail identifying the most severe punishment available within the
jurisdiction, the top of the severity range, and assessing the sentence at issue
in comparison with the most severe punishment. Examining this
relationship would provide additional information with which to evaluate
sentence severity.
In terms of the actual sentence likely to be served, it may be significantly
less severe than the sentence imposed, particularly in state systems versus
the federal system. As a practical matter, the realistic probable sentence
length is more relevant to sentence severity than the formal sentence. While
calculating the likely period of incarceration is a more difficult task than
examining the ranges set forth in sentencing statutes and guidelines,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and probation personnel could likely assist
courts by providing this information. "[M]any States provide good-time
credits and parole, often permitting release after, say, one-third of the
sentence has been served." '216 Justice Breyer's analysis, in his Ewing dissent,
of the challenged sentence focused in part on "the length of the prison term
in real time, i.e., the time that the offender is likely actually to spend in
prison." '2 17 Breyer reasoned that Ewing's triggering conduct and criminal
history were similar to that of both Helm and Rummel, whose sentences
were held, respectively, to be unconstitutionally disproportionate and to
pass constitutional muster.218 "The one critical factor that explains the
214. The federal sentencing guidelines provide that: "Age may be a reason to depart
downward in a case in which the defendant is elderly and infirm and where a form of
punishment such as home confinement might be equally efficient as and less costly than
incarceration." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5Hl.1 (2007); see also Molly
Fairchild James, The Sentencing of Elderly Criminals, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1025, 1044 (1992)
("Elderly prisoners should not be sentenced to what amounts to life sentences, if the legislature
intended to impose a significantly lesser penalty for the specific crime committed.").
215. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1022 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).
216. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 43 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing ALASKA
STAT. § 33.20.010(a) (2000); CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 18-7a (1998)).
217. Id. at 37.
218. Id. at 38-39. In terms of triggering conduct, Ewing's:
[01flense behavior.., is worse than that in Solem, but only to a degree. It
would be difficult to say that the actual behavior itself here (shoplifting)
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difference in the outcome is the length of the likely prison term measured in
real time.,,219 Ewing's real sentence of at least twenty-five years without
parole or good-time credits is more than double Rummel's ten-to-twelve-
year real sentence, and roughly equivalent to Helm's life without parole
real sentence.22 °
The exchange between the Solem majority and dissenting opinions
regarding the possibility of executive clemency further illustrates the
importance of focusing on an offender's real sentence. The Solem Court
rejected the state's attempt to analogize between executive clemency and
the possibility of parole in Rummel v. Estelle.22' The Solem dissent asserted
without citation that "a well-behaved 'lifer' in [Helm's] position is most
differs significantly from that at issue in Solem (passing a bad check) or in
Rummel (obtaining money through false pretenses). Rather the difference lies
in the value of the goods obtained.
Id. "Ewing's prior record consists of four prior felony convictions (involving three burglaries,
one with a knife) contrasted with Helm's six prior felony convictions (including three
burglaries, though none with weapons)." Id. at 38. Rummel had only "two prior felony
convictions (involving small amounts of money)." Id.
219. Id. Helm's real sentence was life in prison without parole, Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.
277, 282-83 (1983), whereas Rummel's sentence of life with parole eligibility in ten to twelve
years amounted to a real sentence of ten to twelve years. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,
267 (1980).
220. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 39. "Ewing's sentence, unlike Rummel's (but like Helm's
sentence in Solem), is long enough to consume the productive remainder of almost any
offender's life. (It means that Ewing himself, seriously ill when sentenced at age 38, will likely
die in prison.)" Id.
221. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 300-03. Parole and commutation are fundamentally different in
that "[p]arole is a regular part of the rehabilitative process. Assuming good behavior, it is the
normal expectation in the vast majority of cases. The law generally specifies when a prisoner
will be eligible to be considered for parole, and details the standards and procedures applicable
at that time." Id. at 300 (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1
(1979); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)). In contrast, commutation "is an ad hoc
exercise of executive clemency. A Governor may commute a sentence at any time for any
reason without reference to any standards." Id. at 301 (citing Conn. Bd. of Pardons v.
Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981)).
Under Texas's parole system at the time that Rummel was decided, a prisoner sentenced to
life could become "'eligible for parole in as little as 12 years."' Id. (citing Rummel, 445 U.S. at
280). By contrast, a prisoner sentenced to life without parole in South Dakota must first receive
the unanimous vote of the board of pardons and paroles to recommend commutation, and then
the Governor has unfettered discretion to accept or reject the recommendation. See id. at 302 &
n.29. Furthermore, commutation merely makes a prisoner eligible for parole. Id. at 302. If Helm
had his sentence commuted to forty years, he still would not have been parole eligible for
twenty-one years, whereas if Rummel had been sentenced to forty years, he could have been
eligible for parole in less than seven years. Id. at 303 n.3 1.
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unlikely to serve for life," ' analogizing to the possibility that Rummel
would receive parole."' The Solem Court brushed aside this argument,
stating in a footnote that: "[S]ince the Rummel Court-like the dissent
today--offered no standards for determining when an Eighth Amendment
violation has occurred, it is controlling only in a similar factual situation." '224
An analysis of the offender's age and life opportunities at the likely time
of release is closely related to an analysis of actual sentence. One could
consider the difference in sentence severity between a thirty-year sentence
imposed on a twenty-year-old offender, and that same thirty-year sentence
imposed on a forty-five-year-old offender. Once the sentence has been
served, the prisoner released at age fifty has some possibility of building a
meaningful life, of working, and of reconnecting with family and friends.
The offender released at age seventy-five,225 on the other hand, has little
likelihood of working, may find that family and friends have died, and will
distinctly be at the end of his or her life.226 Although as a general matter, a
sentence may impact more severely on older offenders, judicial analysis on
a case-by-case basis may reveal exceptions.227 Poor health may also affect
222. Id. at 316 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). This assertion, however, seems unlikely in light of
the majority opinion's analysis of the differences between commutation in South Dakota and
parole in Texas during the relevant time period.
223. Id. There was no basis for an actual comparison because Rummel "was released in
connection with a separate federal habeas corpus proceeding in 1980" when a federal district
court held that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 317 n.8 (citing Rummel
v. Estelle, 498 F. Supp. 793 (W.D. Tex. 1980)). He then pled guilty and was sentenced to time
served, so no one knows if or when Rummel would have been released on parole. Id.
224. Id. at 303 n.32 (majority opinion). The Solem Court viewed Rummel's holding as
limited to its facts since the Rummel Court had failed to articulate a clear, generally applicable
proportionality test. See id. at 300-03.
225. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (2000) (noting one of Sentencing Commission's
amendments effective November 1, 2006, permitting a "court, upon motion of the Director of
the Bureau of Prisons... [to] reduce the term of imprisonment" of any prisoner who "is at least
[seventy] years" old and "has served at least [thirty] years in prison"); see also United States v.
Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1250 (D. Utah 2004) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1) (2000)).
226. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 79 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting). "[Blecause
Andrade was 37 years old when sentenced, the substantial 50-year period amounts to life
without parole." Id. (citing Solem, 463 U.S. at 287).
227. These exceptions may relate to what the offender is likely to lose during the years
spent in prison. For example, a twenty-year-old woman who is sentenced to thirty years
imprisonment may lose the opportunity to have children. Similarly, an exceptional athlete who
is imprisoned during the period of his or her peak physical fitness may not be able to compete
professionally upon his or her release. See D. Orlando Ledbetter, Vick Has Future in NFL After
Time Served: But After Three Years Away from the Game, Teams Might Want Him to Play a
Position Other Than QB, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 11, 2007, at S I (discussing likelihood of former
NFL quarterback Michael Vick's reentering professional football after serving his federal
sentence); Juliet Macur, Vick Receives 23 Months and a Lecture, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2007, at
Dl (same).
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an assessment of sentence severity. To an offender with a life expectancy of
three to five years, a ten-year sentence is the practical equivalent of a life
sentence. One could also consider the same life without possibility of parole
sentence imposed on a fifteen-year-old offender, and on a thirty-five-year-
old offender. The mandatory life sentence imposed on the younger offender,
as a practical matter, is twenty years more severe. Accordingly, courts
should explicitly consider the age, health, and life prospects of the offender
and the effect that this might have on an assessment of sentence severity.
IV. DEVELOPING PROPORTIONALITY RULES
Earlier I commented on the questionable value of having eight
proportionality principles and factors, and now I have added six more tools
for applying the first Solem factor. Although more is sometimes less,
explicit consideration of harm, culpability, violence, and magnitude in
assessing offense gravity; and of the real sentence imposed and the
offender's likely age and opportunities when released would lead to the
development of needed proportionality rules. Much of the current legal
analysis of Eighth Amendment proportionality seems to be based on a
concept I call color matching. This process entails looking at the facts of the
Rummel line of cases, trying to match the facts of the case under
consideration with one of these cases, and then assuming the same
constitutional result.228 Color matching is legal analysis by analogy as
opposed to a deeper, rule-based analysis that legitimately applies principles
of stare decisis. To the extent that courts are applying hidden, implicit rules,
application of my proportionality tools would bring them to the surface.
Following Ewing and Andrade, in which five Justices upheld twenty-five-
year and fifty-year sentences for crimes that clearly would receive low
harm, violence, and magnitude scores,"' superficial color matching wouldeviscerate Eighth Amendment proportionality protection. My proposal
228. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 35 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(asserting that Solem "found grossly disproportionate a somewhat longer sentence imposed on a
recidivist offender for triggering criminal conduct that was somewhat less severe"); Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001, 1004 (reasoning that Harmelin's crime was more serious than
the crime in Hutto and "far more grave than the crime at issue in Solem"); Solem, 463 U.S. at
315 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("The differences between this case and Rummel are
insubstantial.").
229. Ewing and Andrade were both sentenced under California's three-strikes law, but their
triggering crimes were shoplifting of $1,200 of golf clubs and $150 of videotapes respectively.
See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 18; Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 66. No store security or bystanders were
harmed at the time, and the property was recovered, so neither store suffered a financial loss.
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 18; Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 66. Evaluating culpability is a more complex
enterprise based on their prior offenses.
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outlines a process through which courts could assume responsibility for
making contextualized decisions in a manner that is transparent and that
would promote reliance on objective factors. I describe below a carefully
reasoned district court decision to illustrate how use of my offense gravity
and sentence severity factors could lead to greater coherence and
predictability in proportionality jurisprudence.
In United States v. Angelos,23° the court transparently wrestled with a
difficult sentencing decision. 231 In 2002, then twenty-two-year-old Weldon
Angelos sold $350 of marijuana on three occasions to a government
informant.232 After he rejected an initial plea offer in which the government
agreed to recommend a fifteen-year prison sentence, the government
obtained two superseding indictments including charges exposing Angelos
to over 105 years in prison.233 Angelos went to trial, and was convicted on
sixteen counts, including three under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which carried
mandatory minimums. 4 Although Angelos had no significant criminal
history, the three charges with mandatory minimums plus the mandatory
consecutive sentences for the other counts based on the Sentencing
Guidelines totaled sixty-one and one half years.235 Assuming application of
the federal system's approximately 15% good behavior credit, Angelos's
230. 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (D. Utah 2004).
231. See Adam Liptak, Long Term in Drug Case Fuels Debate on Sentencing, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 12, 2004, at A20 (reporting on judge's request for briefing on application of a fifty-five-
year statutory mandatory minimum provision for carrying a gun while selling several hundred
dollars of marijuana on three occasions); Nick Madigan, Judge Questions Long Sentence in
Drug Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2004, at A16 (reporting on judge's reluctance to impose fifty-
five-year sentence and advice to defendant's attorney not only to appeal his decision but to ask
President Bush for clemency once all appeals were exhausted).
232. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1231.
233. Id. at 1231-32. The government rebuffed Angelos's efforts to reopen plea
negotiations, and the case proceeded to trial. Id. at 1232. "While it is constitutionally
permissible for the government to threaten to file enhanced charges against a defendant who
fails to plead guilty, there is always the nagging suspicion that the practice is unseemly." Id. at
1254 (citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978)).
234. Id. at 1232.
235. Id. Angelos's three convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) required imposition of a
fifty-five-year sentence: "Section 924(c) prescribes a five-year mandatory minimum for a first
conviction, and 25 years for each subsequent conviction." Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(l)(A)(i), (c)(1)(C)(i) (2000)). Under the guidelines, the gun enhancement for a drug
offense would have been about two years. See id. at 1239-40 & n.64 (citing U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D I. l(b)(1) (2006)). The judge ultimately decided not to impose the
seventy-eight to ninety-seven month consecutive sentence recommended under the guidelines,
and instead imposed a sentence of one day in prison for all offenses other than the § 924(c)
counts. Id. at 1260-61.
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real sentence is fifty-five years, and since he was twenty-three at the time of
sentencing, he would likely be released at age seventy-eight. '36
Angelos raised an Eighth Amendment challenge to this sentence,237 and
the court applied the Solem three-part test. In examining offense gravity
under the first factor, the court reviewed "the offenses of conviction and the
defendant's criminal history, as well as 'the harm caused or threatened to
the victim or society, and the culpability of the offender.' 2 38 This iteration
of offenses, criminal history, harm, and culpability overlaps with my
proposed offense gravity factors. I would include a consideration of
criminal history in culpability scaling, and explicitly conclude that Angelo's
magnitude scaling was low, based on selling a total of $1050 of marijuana.
The court determined that the actual conduct was modest.239 Angelos was
convicted of twice possessing a handgun under his clothing while selling
small amounts of marijuana without having brandished or used the
handgun, and possessing handguns in his home which were used for
protection while dealing drugs.24 ° In terms of violence:
Angelos did not engage in force or violence, or threats of force or
violence, in furtherance of or in connection with the offenses for
which he has been convicted. No offense involved injury to any
person or the threat of injury to any person. It is well-established
that crimes marked by violence or threat of violence are more
serious and that the absence of direct violence affects the strength
of society's interest in punishing a particular criminal.24" '
Under my rubric, the undercover agent who bought the drugs was not
significantly harmed, Angelos had no prior adult criminal convictions242 and
no remarkably high culpability factors, the magnitude of the crime was low,
and there was no violence. This analysis "strongly suggests not merely
236. See id. at 1232. The judge reasoned that since "[t]he average life expectancy for males
in the United States is about 74 years of age ... Angelos will effectively receive a sentence of
life." Id. at 1239 (citing Elizabeth Arias, United States Life Tables, 2001, 52 NAT'L VITAL STAT.
REP., Feb. 18, 2004, at 1, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/
nvsr52/nvsr52_ 14.pd).
237. It is noteworthy that Angelos was "joined in an amicus brief filed by a distinguished
group of 29 former United States District Judges, United States Circuit Court Judges, and
United States Attorneys, who draw on their expertise in federal criminal law and federal
sentencing issues to urge that the sentence is unconstitutional as disproportionate to the offenses
at hand." Id. at 1256 & n.136 (listing 29 names).
238. Id. at 1257 (footnote omitted) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292-94 (1983))
(citing Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 29 (2003)).
239. Id. at 1257-58.
240. Id. at 1258.
241. Id. (citing Solem, 463 U.S. at 292-93; Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275 (1980)).
242. Id. at 1257-58.
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disproportionality, but gross disproportionality," satisfying the first factor.243
This case demonstrates the viability of my proposal, and suggests that even
multiple drug offenses while in possession of a weapon could be rated low
on an offense gravity scale if (1) no one is harmed, as opposed to injuring
the agent or actual victim; (2) culpability is low, as opposed to an offender
with multiple prior offenses; (3) there is no violence, as opposed to shooting
someone; and (4) the drug is marijuana and the quantity is small, as
opposed to dealing large quantities of heroin or cocaine. Although the court
then confirmed gross disproportionality through intra- and
interjurisdictional review, 44 it engaged in a form of color matching with
Hutto v. Davis,"' in which a forty-year sentence for possession of nine
ounces of marijuana had passed constitutional muster, 246 and reluctantly
imposed Angelos's fifty-five-year sentence. The Tenth Circuit upheld the
sentence imposed, but criticized the district court for "fail[ing] to accord
proper deference to Congress's decision to severely punish criminals who
repeatedly possess firearms in connection with drug-trafficking crimes, and
erroneously downplay[ing] the seriousness of Angelos's crimes. 247
243. Id. at 1258.
244. See id. at 1244-55, 1259 (comparing Angelos's sentence, 738 months, with that of an
aircraft hijacker, 293 months, and a terrorist who detonates a bomb in a public place, 235
months, and noting that "Angelos['s] sentence is longer than he would receive in any of the fifty
states").
245. 454 U.S. 370 (1982).
246. The court did not, however, consider the fact that five years after Davis's conviction,
the state legislature reduced the maximum penalty for his offenses to ten years. See Hutto, 454
U.S. at 377-79 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 385-86 & nn.3-4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Additionally, the fact that Hutto was decided by summary disposition without full briefing and
argument may impact the potency of its stare decisis effect. See Kenneth F. Ripple & Gary J.
Saalman, Rule 1] in the Constitutional Case, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 788, 812-16 (1988) ("[I]t
is also clear that the Court gives far less weight to these summary dispositions than it does to
cases rendered after full argument and opinion."). Third, analysis of Davis's real sentence might
have resulted in a sentence severity of significantly less than forty years after accounting for
good-time credits and the possibility of parole. Finally, to the extent that the sentencing
enhancement in Angelos was driven by the § 924(c) gun enhancement, Hutto did not involve
guns, and perhaps could have been distinguished as not analogous.
247. United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738, 753 (10th Cir. 2006). With less than three
years on the bench, Judge Paul Cassell noted that he had sentenced hundreds of defendants
under the Guidelines and federal mandatory minimum statutes, and that the required sentences
had been "tough but fair." Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1261. Although he had viewed a few
sentences as excessive, they still "seemed to be within the realm of reason." Id. He asserted that:
"This case is different. It involves a first offender who will receive a life sentence for crimes far
less serious than those committed by many other offenders-including violent offenders and
even a murderer-who have been before me." Id. He recommended that the President commute
Angelos's sentence to no more than eighteen years based on the jury recommendations. See id.
at 1262.
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CONCLUSION
The key to resuscitating proportionality analysis in noncapital criminal
sentencing lies in strengthening the rigor with which courts analyze offense
gravity and sentence severity. Courts need a clear methodology for
engaging in Eighth Amendment analysis and must be empowered to trust
their own case-by-case conclusions. Confusion in Supreme Court case law
has resulted in an overreliance on legislative primacy, penological
pluralism, federalism, and gross disproportionality in place of principled
application of the first Solem factor. In terms of process, transparency
creates a means for capturing the analytical work entailed in deciding
individual cases, and limited deference encourages courts to take
responsibility for making proportionality judgments. A felt sense of justice
relates to developing substantive retributivist limits on the relationship
between crime and punishment. These three principles supplement and
modify the Supreme Court's proportionality principles in the same way that
my proposed proportionality tools outline an analytical framework within
the modified Solem test. Explicitly considering offense gravity factors
(harm, culpability, violence, and magnitude) and sentence severity factors
(an offender's real sentence, and likely age and life opportunities upon
release) is critical to better decisionmaking and the development of
experience-based analytical rules. Courts' ability to make gross
disproportionality judgments would be enhanced by more detailed and
thoughtful assessments of offense gravity and sentence severity.
Proportionality in noncapital criminal sentencing can be resuscitated by
clarifying the theoretical framework already contained in Supreme Court
precedent and moving beyond a color matching approach.
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